Jewish philosophy -- Early works to 1800; Judaism -- Works to 1900; Philosophy, Medieval -- Early works to 1800
“None of the accidents form the substratum of another accident; it
cannot be said, This is an accident to a thing which is itself an
accident to a substance. All accidents are directly connected with the
substance.” The Mutakallemim deny the indirect relation of the accident
to the substance, because if such a relation were assumed it would
follow that the second accident could only exist in the substance after
another accident had preceded it, a conclusion to which they would
object even with regard to some special accidents; they prefer to show
that these accidents can exist in every possible substance, although
such substance is not determined by any other accident; for they hold
that all the accidents collectively determine the thing. They advance
also another proof [in support of this proposition], namely: The
substratum which is the bearer of certain attributes must continue to
exist for a certain time; how, then, could the accident;
which—according to their opinion—does not remain in existence for two
moments, become the substratum of something else?
Tenth Proposition.
This proposition concerns the theory of “admissibility,” which is
mentioned by the Mutakallemim, and forms the principal support of their
doctrine. Mark its purport: they observe that everything conceived by
the imagination is admitted by the intellect as possible; e.g., that
the terrestrial globe should become the all-encompassing sphere, or
that this sphere should become the terrestrial globe; reason does not
find here an impossibility; or that the sphere of fire should move
towards the centre, and the sphere of earth towards the circumference.
Human intellect does not perceive any reason why a body should be in a
certain place instead of being in another. In the same manner they say
that reason admits the possibility that an existing being should be
larger or smaller than it really is, or that it should be different in
form and position from what it really is; e.g., a man might have the
height of a mountain, might have several heads, and fly in the air; or
an elephant might be as small as an insect, or an insect as huge as an
elephant. This method of admitting possibilities is applied to the
whole Universe. Whenever they affirm that a thing belongs to this class
of admitted possibilities, they say that it can have this form, and
that it is also possible that it be found differently, and that the one
form is not more possible than the other; but they do not ask whether
the reality confirms their assumption. They say that the thing which
exists with certain constant and permanent forms, dimensions, and
properties, only follows the direction of habit, just as the king
generally rides on horseback through the streets of the city, and is
never found departing from this habit; but reason does not find it
impossible that he should walk on foot through the place; there is no
doubt that he may do so, and this possibility is fully admitted by the
intellect.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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