Jewish philosophy -- Early works to 1800; Judaism -- Works to 1900; Philosophy, Medieval -- Early works to 1800
Similarly, earth moves towards the centre, fire turns away
from the centre; fire causes heat, water causes cold, in accordance
with a certain habit; but it is logically not impossible that a
deviation from this habit should occur, namely, that fire should cause
cold, move downward, and still be fire; that the water should cause
heat, move upward, and still be water. On this foundation their whole
fabric is constructed. They admit, however, the impossibility of two
opposite properties coexisting at the same time in one substance. This
is impossible; reason would not admit this possibility. Again, reason
does not admit the possibility of a substance existing without an
accident, or an accident existing without a substance, a possibility
admitted by some of the Mutakallemim. It is also impossible that a
substance should become an accident, that an accident should become a
substance, or that one substance should penetrate another. They admit
that reason rejects all these things as impossible. It is perfectly
true that no notion whatever can be formed of those things which they
describe as impossible; whilst a notion can be formed of those things
which they consider as possible. The philosophers object to this
method, and say, You call a thing impossible because it cannot be
imagined, or possible because it can be imagined; and thus you consider
as possible that which is found possible by imagination, not by the
intellect, consequently you determine that a thing is necessary,
possible, or impossible in some instances, by the aid of the
imagination—not by the intellect—and in other instances by the ordinary
common sense, as Abu Nasr says in speaking of that which the
Mutakallemim call intellect. It is clear that they describe as possible
that which can be imagined, whether the reality correspond to it or
not, and as impossible that which cannot be imagined. This proposition
can only be established by the nine aforementioned propositions, and no
doubt these were exclusively required for the support of this
proposition. This you will see clearly when I shall show and explain to
you some important parts of this theory, which I shall now introduce in
the form of a discussion supposed to have taken place between a
Mutakallem and a philosopher.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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