Jewish philosophy -- Early works to 1800; Judaism -- Works to 1900; Philosophy, Medieval -- Early works to 1800
All these propositions lead to the conclusion that a human being
is not better constituted to become wise than the bat, and establish
the theory of admissibility expressed in this [tenth] proposition.
Every effort was made to demonstrate this proposition, because it is
the best means for proving anything they like, as will be explained.
Note.—Mark, O reader, that if you know the nature of the soul and its
properties, and if you have a correct notion of everything which
concerns the soul, you will observe that most animals possess
imagination. As to the higher class of animals, that is, those which
have a heart, it is obvious that they have imagination. Man’s
distinction does not consist in the possession of imagination, and the
action of imagination is not the same as the action of the intellect,
but the reverse of it. For the intellect analyses and divides the
component parts of things, it forms abstract ideas of them, represents
them in their true form as well as in their causal relations, derives
from one object a great many facts, which—for the intellect—totally
differ from each other, just as two human individuals appear different
to the imagination; it distinguishes that which is the property of the
genus from that which is peculiar to the individual,—and no proof is
correct, unless founded on the former; the intellect further determines
whether certain qualities of a thing are essential or non-essential.
Imagination has none of these functions. It only perceives the
individual, the compound in that aggregate condition in which it
presents itself to the senses; or it combines things which exist
separately, joins some of them together, and represents them all as one
body or as a force of the body. Hence it is that some imagine a man
with a horse’s head, with wings, etc. This is called a fiction, a
phantasm; it is a thing to which nothing in the actual world
corresponds. Nor can imagination in any way obtain a purely immaterial
image of an object, however abstract the form of the image may be.
Imagination yields therefore no test for the reality of a thing.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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