Jewish philosophy -- Early works to 1800; Judaism -- Works to 1900; Philosophy, Medieval -- Early works to 1800
It has thus been clearly shown that in man exists a certain faculty
which is entirely distinct from imagination, and by which the
necessary, the possible, and the impossible can be distinguished from
each other. This inquiry is most useful. It is of the greatest profit
to him who desires to guard himself against the errors of men guided by
imagination! Do not think that the Mutakallemim ignore this altogether;
to some extent they do take it into consideration; they know it, and
call that which can be imagined without having reality—as, e.g., the
corporeality of God—a phantom and a fancy; they state frequently that
such phantoms are not real. It is for this reason that they advance the
first nine propositions and establish on them the proof of the tenth,
according to which all those imaginable things which they wish to admit
as possible are really possible, because of the similarity of all atoms
and the equality of all accidents as regards their accidentality, as we
have explained.
Consider, O reader, and bear in mind that this requires deep research.
For there are certain notions which some believe to be founded on
reason, while others regard them as mere fictions. In such cases it
would be necessary to find something that could show the difference
between conceptions of the intellect and mere imaginary fancies. When
the philosopher, in his way of expressing himself, contends, “Reality
is my evidence; by its guidance I examine whether a thing is necessary,
possible, or impossible,” the religionist replies, “This is exactly the
difference between us; that which actually exists, has, according to my
view, been produced by the will of the Creator, not by necessity; just
as it has been created with that special property, it might have been
created with any other property, unless the impossibility which you
postulate be proved by a logical demonstration.”
About this admissibility (of imaginable things) I shall have to say
more, and I shall return to it in various parts of this treatise; for
it is not a subject which should be rejected in haste and on the spur
of the moment.
Eleventh Proposition.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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