The heart of the railroad problem: The history of railway discrimination in the United States, the chief efforts at control and the remedies proposed, with hints from other countriesParsons, Frank
History
The heart of the railroad problem: The history of railway discrimination in the United States, the chief efforts at control and the remedies proposed, with hints from other countries
Parsons, Frank
Railroads -- Freight -- Rates -- United States; Railroads and state -- United States
The Beef Trust has compelled the railroads to fix a very low minimum
carload limit—20,000 lbs. on dressed beef, etc., against 26,000 to
30,000 lbs. on products the big Trusts are not interested in. If a load
is below the carload limit it has to pay less-than-carload rates, which
are 20 percent or more higher than carload rates. It is for the interest
of the railroads to keep the minimum carload limit at a good height to
prevent hauling cars with small loads and low rates, and to reduce the
effect of the prevalent custom of billing Trust cars at the minimum no
matter how heavily they are really loaded. The railroads have made
efforts to unite on a higher carload limit, but without avail so far. On
Dec. 12, 1903, it is said, 16 presidents and managers of the greatest
railroads in America met in New York and decided to make 24,000 lbs. the
minimum on dressed meats. The proceedings were under promise of secrecy
by all concerned. But within two days the Trust people knew all about
the secret meeting, and they took measures which prevented the new order
from ever taking effect. No agreement has ever been formulated that will
stand against the power of the Trust, the seductiveness of its promises
of diverting new masses of business to the yielding road, and the terror
of its threats of withdrawal of traffic from the unyielding.
These advantages—excessive mileage rates, high speed, exclusive
contracts, exorbitant icing charges, espionage of competitors, control
of tariffs, low carload limit, and go-as-you-please inspection—have the
same effect as a very large rebate; the private-car owners can ship at
very much lower cost than ordinary unprivileged shippers. The profits
are immense—$72,000 a day, it is said for the Armour cars.
It is estimated that the railroads pay the Beef Trust’s car-lines about
$25,000,000 a year in rebates or payments in practical violation of the
law.
On the basis of the very moderate Beef Trust Report of the Department of
Commerce, Mr. Baker figures the annual profits on the 14,000 Armour
refrigerator cars, from rentals alone, at $200 net per car, or
$2,800,000—nearly $3,000,000 a year, not including the enormous sums
extorted in excessive icing charges, nor the rebates and commissions
paid by the railroads in addition to the mileage. The estimate of $200 a
car is probably too low, for Mr. Robbins, manager of the Armour
Car-Lines, has testified that they rent old, inferior cars to breweries,
etc., at $204 to $280 per year.
Mr. Baker says: “Can any simple-minded person see any difference between
a payment of $3,000,000 net profit on mileage annually to a favored
shipper like Armour, and an old-fashioned cash rebate of $3,000,000? I
confess I cannot.”[287]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account