If the reader will examine the chart he will see that the cotton figures (which are placed below the route-lines) are less than the first-class rates (which are printed above the route-lines) in every case except between the Missouri River and Denver, and in some cases the cotton rates are only half the first-class rates. In view of the practically universal custom of the railroads in this relation, the deviation in the case of Denver amounted to a practical discrimination against that city and any shippers who desired to lay down cotton goods in Colorado. The railroads carried the goods from Boston to Chicago for 55 cents, while charging $1.25 from Omaha to Denver, more than double the charge for half the distance. Railroad rate-makers do not base their tariffs on broad considerations of justice, but get what they can out of the traffic for their own lines, while the Commission asks what rate will yield a fair profit, and will be just to the public and to the individuals and localities involved, considering all the circumstances and their relation to transportation conditions throughout the country. At best, however, it cannot be denied that great inconvenience and some injustice might be inflicted upon the railroads by public rate revision. It seems to come down to the choice of the least of two evils. The President and the people say that if the railroads are left free to make the rates they do not deal fairly; experience shows that they discriminate unjustly between persons and places, and put some rates too high and others too low. The railroads say that if a public board should make the rates the companies might not be treated fairly. Both statements are true. But it is clear that somebody must make the rates. And it is equally clear that there is no system of rate-making that will do perfect justice. I know of no railway minister or traffic manager in Europe or America who even dreams he knows of any method of rate-making that will do justice all round under present industrial conditions. The post-office principle may ultimately be applied to diffuse the burden of distance over the whole community, but it is not practicable at present. If then a certain amount of injustice is unavoidable, and we must choose between injustice to a small group of stockholders or to eighty millions of people, which alternative shall we accept? If there is no way to solve this problem that will not work injustice somewhere, shall it be to the little group of profit-makers or to the great public, the people of the United States?