Besides this quantitative comparison, there is a qualitative comparison that is still more weighty. Such injustice as may be done to the railways is merely a matter of diminished dividends on stocks, a very large part of which is water; while the false rates and unfair discriminations made by the railway managers not only affect property interests many times greater than railway stocks, but deny equal opportunity and undermine morals, manhood, government, civilization, and progress,—values far higher than any financial items whatever. Moreover, it is not unlikely that a board constituted somewhat differently from the present one might eliminate most of the errors of the Interstate Commission as well as those of the railway. What are the causes at work in the case? The reason the Commission has made some injurious rulings is that they lack the thorough acquaintance with traffic conditions that the railway managers possess. And the reason the railway managers make rates that are contrary to public policy is that they are more or less influenced by motives that are antagonistic to the public interest. The Commission is disinterested; it has no wish or personal interest leading to unfairness either to the railroads or the public; its motive is right, but its knowledge is imperfect. The railway traffic managers, on the other hand, have much more perfect understanding of the transportation business, but their interest is not altogether in harmony with justice and the public good. Is it not possible to create a board that shall have the thorough knowledge of first-class railway experts, together with the high motives and unmixed interests of an honorable public commission or court, and so remove the chief causes that have worked injustice in the past? It is possible that there may be another fair solution,—that the rates may be made neither by the railroads themselves nor by a body representing the public alone. As there are three partners in the railroad business, as in every great industry,—viz., labor, capital, and the public,—it may be regarded as a case for arbitration, or for decision, not by any one partner alone, but by a board representing all three partners. Should there not be a board on which the railways have a right to representation, the workers being represented too, and the public also having fair representation upon the board? Then the decision would represent the co-ordination of thought and interest of the three great parties concerned in the railway problem. Perhaps such a solution would be superior in its justice to decision either by the railways alone or by a body representing the public only.