But it is clear that the final power to pass on transportation rates must rest somewhere. That railways are public highways, and transportation charges in the nature of taxes, are settled principles of law and economics. That governments have a right to regulate railroad rates is everywhere recognized. But how is the right to be effectively exercised? If legislative bodies attempt to exercise it directly, the lack of detailed information as to specific cases and the failure of elasticity and adaptation to the needs of business, urged against Commission work, would be emphasized a hundred fold. There is no way but to delegate the power to an expert board, not with the expectation of perfect justice, but of the greatest attainable justice. The most important question of all in this connection remains to be considered, viz., would the possession of the rate-fixing power enable a regulative board to stop discriminations? Practically every rate question but one involves the question of discrimination. The exception is the query: “Are the total charges unreasonable?” It is conceivable that the relations of the various rates might be fair but the whole tariff might be pitched too high or too low; then the reasonableness of that tariff would be the only question on which action would be requisite. But in practice there are always some rates that are low enough, some too low, and some too high. And there are always two active questions in reference to any rate: 1. Is it fair in relation to the rates accorded to other persons, places, or commodities? 2. Is it reasonable? In other words, is it such that if other rates stood in true relations with it the total margin of profit would yield a fair return and no more than a fair return on the investment? Both questions are very difficult, especially the latter. The reasonableness of each particular rate depends not only on its own individual circumstances, but on a comparison with all other rates and a consideration of the company’s entire business. Difficult as it is, it would seem necessary to try to answer it in a broad way, at least in respect to the tariff as a whole, for the failure to answer it may mean unjust taxation of industry, inflation of capital values, dividends on watered stock, vast accumulations of wealth in the hands of railway owners, political corruption, and the whole train of evils that follow in the wake of industrial aggression. Yet deeply important as it is to secure reasonable rates, how futile it would appear to attempt to do it by means of a board making orders as to this, that, and the other rate complained of, but without power to revise the tariff as a whole, or to require any particular standard of service in return for the rate decided upon. For every cent cut off the rate by the Commission, the railways, if they are agreed to act in harmony, can easily withdraw two cents’ worth of facilities. Suppose the Commission can fix a reasonable