The masters of the Kremlin would, indeed, have every right to laugh long and loud, and to take such foolhardy action on our part as further evidence of what they call “the decadence of the bourgeois democracies.” For, once we make such a magnanimous unilateral solemn renunciation of the one weapon that promises to become the greatest single deterrent against war, without even bothering to ask Russia publicly to do likewise, Russia could then proceed calmly at her leisure to build up her A-bomb stockpile, with the complete assurance from us that she need not worry about our H-bomb as long as she does not use one against us or our allies. After she has accumulated an adequate A-bomb stockpile—and fifty to one hundred would be adequate from her standpoint—she would then be in a position, already attained by us now, to proceed with her H-bomb program, knowing full well that we would never use H-bombs against her while she is still without them. And while she obviously could not use anything she does not have, she could well afford to make aggressive war even before she has an H-bomb, or to bide her time until she does, the choice being entirely hers. And if she waits until she has the H-bomb, the decision whether to use it or not would still be entirely hers, so that she could use it whenever she decides it is to her advantage to do so, whereas we should have to wait on her pleasure, having morally bound ourselves, without qualification, not to use it first, even if our very existence depended on it. It can thus be easily seen that this “after you, my dear Alphonse” gesture on our part in a matter that may involve our very existence would be more than quixotic. It is likely to prove suicidal. It will not improve the prospects of world peace; on the contrary it will weaken them. It will not enhance our moral stature, since the world does not have much respect for starry-eyed dreamers with their heads in the clouds. But while we must keep our feet planted on the ground, we need not lose sight of the stars. Our refusal to expose ourselves by giving Russia the great advantages mentioned, does not mean that we retain the right to use the H-bomb indiscriminately as though it were just another weapon. There are, I shall presently show, both legitimate and illegitimate uses to which the H-bomb can be put, and it is the failure so far, even by eminent scientists, to distinguish between these two types of possible uses that is responsible for a great deal, if not all, of the confusion and much futile debate that have followed the President’s announcement of his directive to continue work on the hydrogen bomb, and for the flood of verbiage that will continue to plague and bewilder us until we take time to acquaint ourselves with the facts about the H-bomb.