The Heroic Record of the British Navy: A Short History of the Naval War, 1914-1918Bashford, H. H. (Henry Howarth), Sir
History
The Heroic Record of the British Navy: A Short History of the Naval War, 1914-1918
Bashford, H. H. (Henry Howarth), Sir
Great Britain. Royal Navy; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
Such was the geographical aspect of the problem that the Admiralty was
called upon to consider; and the fortifications protecting the Straits
were arranged somewhat as follows. Commanding the entrance, on the
European side, were forts at Cape Helles and Sedd-el-Bahr with two
others on the Asiatic side, Fort Orkanieh and Kum Kale. These
contained, between them, ten 10.2-inch guns, four 9.2-inch, and two
6-inch guns. A few miles higher up, about four below the Narrows, and
just south of Point Kephez on the Asiatic coast, was Fort Dardanos,
mounting five 6-inch guns in rectangular turrets, at a height of about
350 feet. Opposite this, on the European side, was Fort Soghandere.
The mouth of the Narrows themselves was very strongly guarded both at
Chanak in Asia and Kilid Bahr on the Peninsula; and a fleet approaching
the Narrows {112} would find itself confronted--apart from an unknown
number of field-guns and howitzers--with ten 14-inch, eighteen
10.2-inch, eight 9.2-inch, and thirty-seven 6-inch guns, as well as
twenty-one 8.3-inch howitzers. When it is remembered that, in
addition, there were the channel minefields and land torpedo-stations
to be reckoned with, and an area of manoeuvre less than four miles at
the widest, it will be seen that the prospect, on paper at any rate,
was a sufficiently formidable one from every standpoint. Could it
reasonably be faced by the navy alone? Was an accompanying army
absolutely essential? And, if so, of what numbers must the latter
consist to ensure success?
These were the questions that now inevitably arose; and if, from a
technical standpoint, the first could be answered satisfactorily, there
would be many obvious advantages in the purely naval attack. If the
navy, that was to say, could force itself unaided into the Sea of
Marmora and shell Constantinople, troops that would be very valuable
elsewhere need not be diverted to a new theatre of war; a great deal of
tonnage would be saved at a time when the pressure on our mercantile
marine was everywhere immense, while, if it were unsuccessful, such an
attack could be abandoned, it was thought, without much damage to our
prestige.
It was quite clear, of course, that, unless the Straits could be
secured behind it, the Fleet would not remain there for very long.
But, from evidence at the Government's disposal, it was believed that
its arrival would have immediate and far-reaching results--that a
revolution in Constantinople against {113} the pro-German Young Turk
Party would almost certainly ensue; and that Bulgaria, then neutral and
undecided, might definitely ally herself with the Entente Powers.
Further, the opening of the Dardanelles would at once facilitate the
admission into Russia of much-needed munitions, and would release, for
the benefit of the world at large, considerable supplies of cereals.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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