It has been justly remarked that serious risk of error is set up even by the long-current claim of naturalist critics to "treat the Bible like any other book." Even in their meaning the phrase should have run: "like any other Sacred Book of antiquity"; inasmuch as critical tests and methods are called for in the scrutiny of such books which do not apply in the case of others. But inasmuch, further, as the Christian Sacred Books form a problem by themselves, a kind of scrutiny which in the case of other books of cult-history might substantially reveal all the facts may here easily fail to do so. The unsuspecting student, coming to a narrative in which supernatural details are mingled with "natural," decides simply to reject the former and take as history what is left. It is the method of the amateur mythologists of ancient Greece, derided by Socrates, and chronically resuscitated in all ages by men seeking short cuts to certitude where they have no right to any. If the narrative of the Trial and Crucifixion, thus handled, is found to be still incredible in point of time-arrangement, the adaptor meets the difficulty by reducing the time-arrangement to probability and presenting the twice redacted result as "incontestable" history. All this, as will be shown in the following pages, is merely a begging of the question. A scientific analysis points to a quite different solution, which the naïf "historical" student has never considered. He is still kept in countenance, it is true, by "specialists" of the highest standing. The average "liberal" theologian still employs the explanatory method of Toland; and anthropologists still offer him support. Thus Sir James Frazer, by far the most learned collector of mytho-anthropological lore in his age, positively refuses to apply to the history of the Christian cult his own express rule of mythology--formulated before him [1] but independently reiterated by him--that "all peoples have invented myths to explain why they observed certain customs," and that a graphic myth to explain a rite is presumptively "a simple transcript of a ceremony"; which is the equivalent of the doctrine of Robertson Smith, that "in almost every case the myth was derived from the ritual, and not the ritual from the myth," and of the doctrine of K. O. Müller that "the mythus sprang from the worship, and not the worship from the mythus." What justification Sir James can give for his refusal to act on his own principles is of course a matter for full and careful consideration. But at least the fact that he has to justify the refusal to apply in a most important case one of the best-established generalizations of comparative mythology is not in this case a recommendation of the principle of authority to scientific readers.