De Soto sent all available men out against the Indians, and suppressed them, for the time. But as soon as he left Santiago for Havana, taking with him all the fighting men in the eastern end of the island, the Cimarrons sprang to arms again behind him and became more menacing than ever. They again threatened Baracoa, and were active even in the suburbs of Santiago itself. The departure of Vasco de Figueroa from Camaguey was disastrous. He had been vigorous and unsparing in his suppression of even the slightest uprising, and in his absence the Indians were freed from the greatest restraining influence in that part of the island. The general confusion of affairs was further aggravated by the intrigues of two marplots. One of these was Gonzalo de Guzman, who had remained in the island after his removal from office, and who was never weary in mischief-making. He kept himself in frequent communication with the government in Spain, and made all sorts of complaints against de Soto and against the Florida enterprise. Doubtless he was right in saying that the taking of so many fighting men out of Cuba for Florida endangered the peace and safety of the island; though we must think that he exaggerated the condition of Cuba when he wrote to the Spanish government that two-thirds of the island had become depopulated, and all of the towns in the central part of it had been or were in imminent danger of being burned. The other trouble-maker was the new Bishop, Diego Sarmiento, who had succeeded Bishop Ramirez, deceased. He maintained a large establishment of slaves, and continued the political policy of his predecessor. He had arrived in Cuba almost simultaneously with de Soto, and inclined toward the policy of the latter in respect to Florida.