Chief Justice Abbott then, after stating to the jury the nature of the indictment, proceeded to instruct them as to the law of the case. The accusation charged three persons as aiding and concurring in the death of Mr. Scott: two individuals only appeared; but if the jury believed that the individuals at the bar were really two of those who had aided in the commission of the crime, it mattered not by whose particular hand the pistol had been discharged. The distinction, in cases of duels, between manslaughter and murder had been very clearly and correctly marked out by the learned counsel for the prosecution: if persons in heat of blood went out and fought with deadly weapons, then the law, allowing for the frailty of human nature, deemed the party killing guilty of manslaughter only; but if, yielding to a false notion of honour, they went out upon deliberation and in cold blood to fight, then the death of one man fixed the crime of the murder upon all concerned; upon seconds (frequently the more culpable parties) as well as upon principals. The first question then was, were the gentlemen at the bar two of the parties known to have been in the field at the time when the shot was fired? and next, was the duel fought in heat of blood or upon deliberation? His lordship then recapitulated the main points of the evidence, and upon that evidence left the fact of identity to the jury. It was possible, he said, that the real perpetrators of the crime might have escaped from the field before the arrival of Mr. Pettigrew, and that the prisoners at the bar might have appeared accidentally at the moment; still the onus of showing that such had been the case lay in some measure upon them. Upon the second point, the feeling under which (assuming the identity) the duel had taken place—of the time or place at which the quarrel originated there was no evidence. The declaration of Mr. Scott, at the moment of his fall, that all had been done fairly and honourably, was, although the law would not recognise such ideas of honour, entitled to the attention of the jury; and there was another circumstance, arising out of the words of the supposed Mr. Christie, to which their consideration should be directed. They were these—“Why was I allowed to fire a second time? I fired down the field at first; what could I do more? I was compelled to fire in my own defence.” Now, the circumstances were not such as would, in law, acquit a man as having fired in his own defence; but the words might have an operation upon the feeling under which the second shot had been fired. It was possible that Mr. Christie, having forborne to take aim the first time, might have fired his second shot under an impulse of immediate anger, produced by the failure of his pacific proceeding; and in that case, although his adversary fell, the crime amounted only to manslaughter. The Lord Chief Justice concluded by recommending the jury, in a case of doubt, to take