he was struck first by the deceased; or that he had often declined to meet him, and was prevailed upon to do it by his importunity; or that it was his intent only to vindicate his reputation; or that he meant not to kill, but only to disarm his adversary; for, since he deliberately engaged in an act highly unlawful, in defiance of the laws, he must, at his peril, abide the consequence thereof. And from hence it follows, that if two persons quarrel over-night, and appoint to fight next day, or quarrel in the morning and agree to fight in the afternoon, or such a considerable time after, by which, in common intendment, it must be presumed that the blood was cooled, and then they meet and fight, and one kills the other, he is guilty of murder. And whenever it appears, from the whole circumstances, that he who kills another on a sudden quarrel, was master of his temper at the time, he is guilty of murder; as if, after the quarrel, he fall into a discourse, and talks calmly thereon; or, perhaps, if he have so much consideration as to say that the place wherein the quarrel happens is not convenient for fighting, or that, if he should fight at present, he should have the disadvantage by reason of the height of his shoes.’ The last observation refers to Lord Morley’s case, where, though a case of manslaughter, it was a circumstance strongly pressed to show that the offence was one of a deeper dye. Sir Michael Foster, in his Discourse on Homicide, says:—‘Upon this principle, deliberate duelling, if death ensues, is, in the eye of the law, murder; because duels are generally founded on a feeling of revenge: and though a person should be drawn into a duel upon a motive not so criminal, but merely upon the punctilio of what the swordsmen call honour, that is no excuse; for those who deliberately seek the blood of another, act in defiance of all laws, human and divine. But if, on a sudden quarrel, they fight upon the spot, or if they presently fetch their weapons, and go into a field and fight, and one of them falleth, that is but manslaughter, because it may be presumed the blood never cooled. It will be otherwise if the parties appoint the next day to fight, or even the same day, at such an interval as that the passion may have subsided, or if, from any circumstances attending the case, it may reasonably be presumed that their judgment had controlled the first transports of passion before they engaged. The same rule will hold if, after a quarrel, the parties fall into other discourse or diversions, and continue so engaged as to afford reasonable time for cooling.’ Blackstone, in his fourth volume, page 199, thus writes, when describing and defining the crime of murder:—‘This takes in the case of deliberate duelling, where both parties meet avowedly with an intent to murder; thinking it their duty, as gentlemen, and claiming it as their right, to wanton with their own lives and those of their