fellow-creatures; without any warrant or authority from any power, either divine or human, but in direct contradiction to the laws both of God and man; and therefore the law has justly fixed the crime and punishment of murder on them, and on their seconds also.’ “My Lords, these are the highest authorities known to the law of England, and they are uniformly followed by the English judges. The most recent cases of this nature which have occurred within the last few years, are those of Sir John Jeffcott,[8] and the parties concerned in the death of Mr. Mirfin; and in these the doctrine I have stated to your lordships was laid down and acted upon strictly. Such, then, being the definition of murder constantly given from the bench on trials for life and death, are not your lordships to suppose that the legislature has made use of the word ‘murder’ in the same sense; and that when we find in Lord Ellenborough’s Act, in the 9th of Geo. IV. and in this of the 1st of Victoria, the expression ‘with intent to commit murder,’ it means with intent to do that which, if accomplished, would amount in law to the crime of murder? The legislature, and your lordships as part of it, must be taken to have well known what was the legal definition of murder, and to have used the expression, in a judicial act, in its legal sense. Then, my Lords, however painful the consideration may be, does it not necessarily follow, that the first count of the indictment is completely found? The circumstances clearly show that the Earl of Cardigan and Captain Tuckett met by appointment. The arrangements being completed, they fired twice; the Earl of Cardigan took deliberate aim, fired, and wounded his antagonist. He must be supposed to have intended that which he did. If, unfortunately, death had ensued, would not this have been a case of murder? The only supposition by which the case could be reduced to one of manslaughter would be, that the Earl of Cardigan and Captain Tuckett met casually on Wimbledon Common; that they suddenly quarreled; and that, whilst their blood was hot, they fought; but your lordships will hardly strain the facts so far as to say that this was a casual meeting, when you see that each party was accompanied by a second, and supplied with a brace of pistols, and that the whole affair was conducted according to the forms and solemnities observed when a deliberate duel is fought.—With respect to the second and third counts, I know not what defence can possibly be suggested; because, even if it had been a casual meeting, and if death had ensued under circumstances which would have amounted only to manslaughter, that would be no defence to the second and third counts. I presume to assert that, on the authority of a case which came before the fifteen judges of England, and which was decided; two most learned judges doubting on the occasion, but not dissenting from the decision. The two judges who doubted, were his