The violent language employed by the newspapers on the opposition side laid them open to reprisals. Constant resort to indictments by the attorney-general, and the exception of seditious libels from privilege of parliament, indicate the desire of the king's party to treat press offences in a special way. They were gratified by a ruling of Chief-justice Mansfield in the case of Almon, a bookseller, who was tried on an _ex officio_ indictment for selling Junius's _Letter to the King_. Mansfield laid down that in cases of libel the jury could only deal with the facts of printing and publishing; it belonged to the judge to decide the character of the statement. This was not a new doctrine; it had been declared and acted upon by many earlier judges. The newspaper press, however, had by this time become important, and Mansfield's ruling infringed on the liberties of those engaged upon it, for, while that was the law, a man after being indicted by the attorney-general, who held office by, and at the pleasure of the crown, was deprived of his right to be judged by his peers on the substantial point at issue. Indignant juries refused to convict in libel cases, and Mansfield's ruling was attacked by the opposition in parliament. Chatham and Camden denied its legality. In the commons, though a proposal to abolish _ex officio_ informations received little support, a motion for a committee of inquiry into the rights of juries was only defeated by 184 to 176. Dowdeswell and Burke believed that the question of law was likely to hinder a satisfactory settlement, and in March, 1771, Dowdeswell moved for an act to give juries the powers denied to them. A section of the opposition, however, held with Chatham and Camden that the matter should be settled by a bill declaring that the law gave them these powers. They would not support the motion, which was lost by an overwhelming majority; and Mansfield's ruling was received as law until 1792. [Sidenote: _HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THE PRINTERS._]