The surrender of Burgoyne's army could not in itself affect the issue of the war. Its importance lies in its effect on the policy of foreign nations and specially of France. So far as the Americans alone were concerned, England had good reason to expect ultimate success. They would neither enlist in sufficient numbers to keep up a regular army nor provide for such troops as they had. The meddlesomeness and incapacity of congress were destroying its army; generals were intriguing against one another, soldiers were perishing for lack of necessaries, stores were wasted. Money was scarce and public credit bad. Early in 1778 congress had 5,500,000 paper dollars in circulation, and the value of its paper dollar was from half to a quarter of the silver dollar. Above all, the Americans had no fleet, and were consequently unable to protect their sea-board. Their alliance with France and subsequently with Spain brought them, along with other help, the sea-power without which the issue of the struggle might well have been adverse to them. France and Spain hoped to recoup themselves for former losses, France by conquests in the West Indies, Spain by regaining Gibraltar, Minorca, and Jamaica. In 1775 an agent of the French court went over to America with offers of help, and early in 1776 the Count de Vergennes, foreign minister of Louis XVI., proposed as a system of policy that the Bourbon kings should give secret aid to the Americans and strengthen their own forces, taking care, however, to persuade England that their intentions were pacific. About the same time congress sent Deane to France as a secret agent.