According to the government plan the chief object of his campaign should have been his junction with Burgoyne. The government, that is Germain, certainly erred in not giving him precise orders, while Burgoyne had virtually no discretionary power. Yet it was for Howe, as commander-in-chief on the spot, to judge of the situation without explicit instructions. According to his own statements, his view of the situation was that Burgoyne would march through a friendly country and encounter no enemy except the army of 4,000 men under Schuyler, that Clinton would be able to give him any assistance which he might require, that his own expedition to Philadelphia would divert the enemy from Burgoyne, that he would be able to "account for" Washington, and that if Washington gave him the slip, he would be able to follow him up and prevent him from annoying Burgoyne.[130] These considerations may be supposed to have satisfied him that no direct co-operation with Burgoyne was required of him. Burgoyne had to encounter foes whom neither he nor Howe reckoned upon, and it was Howe's duty to be at hand to prevent their crushing him. Burgoyne made some mistakes in preparing for and prosecuting his campaign, but he and his men exhibited splendid courage, and he is not to be blamed for trying his fortune to the utmost. In view of his orders, and of the risk of leaving a co-operating force unsupported, he was bound to ascertain whether he could force his way through the enemy. The irregular character of the American force rendered success possible, and justified his gallant attempt of October 7. He was a fine soldier, and was regarded with confidence and affection by his subordinates. Clinton seems to have done all that was in his power considering the small force left with him in New York.[131] [Sidenote: _EFFECT OF THE SURRENDER._]