As the British forces were divided between New York and the southern provinces, it is obvious that the issue of the struggle depended on the command of the sea. So long as the British held the ocean way, the southern army would be able to receive reinforcements and supplies, and could be aided by diversions, the French alliance would be of little profit to the Americans, and the long land journey, expensive and open to attacks, would cut off the southern provinces from succours from the north. The navy, as both Clinton and Washington saw, "had the casting vote in the contest".[152] In July, 1780, soon after Clinton returned to New York from South Carolina, a French squadron brought nearly 6,000 men, commanded by Count de Rochambeau, to Rhode Island. A few days after the arrival of Rochambeau, the British fleet under Arbuthnot received reinforcements which made it stronger than the French. Clinton took measures for attacking the French by land and sea, but was called back to New York by a movement on the part of Washington, and a renewal of the plan was defeated by a quarrel between him and Arbuthnot. The seven French ships remained at Newport, blocked up by the British fleet, and though Washington obtained some help from the land force, the greater part stayed to guard the ships. Rodney should have attacked these ships as soon as he arrived at New York in September. He probably thought them of little importance, as they were thoroughly blockaded, and did not care to risk his ships within reach of the French batteries on the shore. The destruction of the squadron was within his power and was well worth some risk. Great as he was on sea, he did not understand the wide aspects of operations of war. The presence of the French compelled the British to keep a large force in New York and so hindered their operations in the south.