Spain had three grievances against Great Britain. She complained that her ships had wrongfully been made prizes, that she was shut out from the Newfoundland fishery, and that British settlements had been made on the bay of Honduras. Charles III, of Spain had a strong leaning towards a French alliance; he was much influenced by the family tie between himself and the other Bourbon powers, and he considered that the destruction of the French navy by Great Britain deprived Spain of a guarantee for the safety of her possessions in the western hemisphere. He believed that by identifying the interests of Spain with those of France, he would gain a satisfactory settlement of his own claims and also better terms for France than she could otherwise obtain. As early as September, 1760, the Count de Fuentes, the Spanish minister in London, presented to Pitt a memorial on the Newfoundland fishery, in which it was stated that a copy had been communicated to the court of France. Indignant at the implied threat, Pitt replied that he was at a loss to understand the meaning of such a communication, and that France had nothing to do with the question.[35] A month later Dutens, secretary to the British embassy at Turin, sent him information which proved that the King of Spain would not long remain a passive spectator of the war.[36] Pitt was thus fully aware of the necessity for watchfulness as to the relations between France and Spain; the correspondence between Fuentes and the Marquis Grimaldi, the Spanish minister at Paris, was regularly intercepted and its contents communicated by Pitt to his colleagues. The two ambassadors were endeavouring to bring about an alliance between their king and Louis, and, on March 10, 1761, Fuentes wrote that "if this is done, at the end of the year we shall have a peace to our liking and France's," and that England would be compelled by "force and fear" to do justice to Spain. Pitt soon showed him and Choiseul how unsafe it was to reckon on English fear.