With these facts in mind, a student of history may find the following words in Admiral Porter’s report of December 27, 1864 (see Report Sec. Navy, 1865, p. 51): “My despatch of yesterday will scarcely give you an idea of my disappointment at the conduct of the army authorities in not attempting to take possession of the forts which had been so completely silenced by our guns; they were so blown up, burst up and torn up that the people inside had no intention of fighting any longer.” Certainly this is not true. Porter guessed at the facts. The Confederate officers (see Scharf) had to use the flat of their swords to get some of the reserves out to man the parapet, but they had a force of nearly 1,000 that would have made a fight. But if Butler had been as anxious to carry the fort by assault as he was to report a failure on the part of Admiral Porter, he would have carried the fort inside of an hour with even the partial force he had landed. Moreover, when he said the beach was “the only practicable route” for an assaulting party, he was mistaken, for General Terry, three weeks later, found a much safer route “under the river bank.” It is an interesting fact that Butler in his book does not attempt any explanation of his lack of knowledge, when before the fort, of the river-bank route. Thomas E. Taylor, a noted blockade-runner, who has printed a book on his experiences, was in Richmond in consultation with the Confederate chiefs at the time of this assault, and wrote the following in a letter to his employers regarding the matter: “They nearly had Fort Fisher; they were within sixty yards of it--and had they pushed on as they ought to have done, could have taken it. It was a terrific bombardment.” Anyway, Butler did not even throw up intrenchments. He abandoned the enterprise altogether. However, the operations against the fort were only suspended. Admiral Porter filled up his ships with ammunition. On January 13, 1865, Gen. Alfred H. Terry landed with 6,000 men. The ships anchored with the monitors at a range of half a mile, and the others outside at three-quarters of a mile (in some cases further), and a storm of bursting shells poured over the fort. It lasted all that day, was continued at intervals during the night and all the next day. The fort replied slowly, partly because ammunition was scarce and partly because of the effect of the Union fire. [Illustration: The Bombardment of Fort Fisher. _From a lithograph._]