A quarrel between Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Eagar, an emancipist
attorney, displayed more forcibly the effect of the decision of the
English Chief Justice. Judge Field presided at a session of magistrates
at Parramatta, when Eagar attempted to act as counsel: this was
prevented by the court; and the judge, as chairman, expressed himself,
in reference to Eagar, in terms of severe disapprobation and contempt,
stigmatising him as a common _barrator_, or mover of quarrels, whom the
Governor might justly prosecute for sedition, or banish from the colony.
Eagar, not daunted by the philippic of the judge, resolved to sue him in
a secondary court for slander, and to recover back fees paid in the
Supreme Court, and which he alleged the judge had levied illegally; but
Judge Field ordered his solicitor to file an affidavit of his belief
that Eagar was under attainder, and prayed for time to obtain an office
copy of his conviction: this course was allowed, and the action
defeated.
Not long after, Eagar attempted to recover certain penalties imposed by
the Act of Charles II. on foreign merchants trading in the British
plantations: the penalties were enormous, and the law was obsolete. The
particular object of Eagar was, to suppress the competition in the sale
of tea, which the superior trading connection of Messrs. L. Mestre and
Co. enabled them to offer. The French merchant very fairly pleaded the
attaint of the plaintiff, and Judge Field, in giving judgment, insisted
on the obvious injustice of the suit; that men, whose trading was
permissive--themselves the creatures of indulgence--and who, by
connivance, were allowed to become wealthy and prosperous--should
endeavour to rouse forgotten and restrictive statutes, to put down
useful commerce, and abuse privileges conceded by the clemency of the
court; to force the court to become the instrument of oppression: he
therefore allowed the plea of the merchants to bar the action of the
plaintiff.
All this, on the face of it, was just; but the emancipists saw that it
gave to the judge a discretion which laid them helpless at his mercy:
the same plea might be offered, to cover a fraudulent debtor, or deprive
a large majority of traders of legal protection. Nor was it a competent
answer, that the policy of the colony had been of an opposite
description: to stand on suffrage, was to stand in peril.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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