The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
History
The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918
Bewsher, F. W. (Frederick William)
Great Britain. Army. Division, 51st (Highland); World War, 1914-1918 -- Regimental histories -- Great Britain
In view of the failure of the first attack, it is doubtful if the
second, which at best could only be hastily improvised, had any prospect
of success. However, at 5 P.M., 17th June, further orders were received
by the Divisional commander to renew the attack on the German salient at
3 A.M. on the night 17-18th after a short intense artillery preparation.
At 2.30 A.M., to the relief of all concerned, this attack was postponed
and subsequently cancelled.
The failure of these attacks can be attributed to the inadequacy of the
artillery preparation. Subsequent battles proved that the number of guns
and the allotment of ammunition per gun required is far in excess of
those allotted to the Division for the battle of Festubert, if infantry
are to have a reasonable chance of success in attacking organised
resistance, protected by strong wire entanglements.
In addition to the inadequacy in the number of guns, the 15-pounders
again proved themselves highly unsatisfactory. As evidence of the
unreliability of their ammunition, it is worth recording that Captain
Duncan of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had an eye knocked
out by a shrapnel bullet half a mile behind the British front line.
On the day after the launching of the first attack, the following
message had been received from Lieut.-General Sir James Rawlinson:
"The Corps commander wishes you to convey his appreciation to the
troops of the 51st Division for their gallant conduct of yesterday and
to-day, particularly to the assaulting battalions--_viz._, the 6th
Scottish Rifles, the 4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the 8th
King's Liverpool Regiment."
On the nights 18-19th and 19-20th June the 7th Division took over the
right sector, leaving only the 153rd Brigade in the line.
On the 24th orders were received for the 51st Division to rejoin the
Indian Corps, and to take over the line from the Lahore Division south
of Laventie. On the 27th June, this relief having been completed, the
G.O.C. took over command of the new sector.
All ranks experienced a sense of relief on leaving the Festubert area.
Not only on account of the serious casualties suffered by many units
during the attacks and the retaliation provoked by them, but also for
other reasons, it was rightly regarded as an unpleasant sector.
Communications had been almost non-existent, so that movement by day was
very restricted. The trenches, where they existed, were very open, and
sniping was rife. The ill-famed "Orchard," which it was hoped might be
consolidated and incorporated into the defences, had an evil reputation.
Breastworks were no sooner erected there by night than they were knocked
down by day. The Germans were, in fact, so opposed to the consolidation
of the Orchard that they introduced trench-mortars to check it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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