In the first three days alone eight separate German Divisions operated on the Divisional front--the 3rd Guards, the 4th and 5th Bavarians, the 17th, 24th Reserves, the 39th, the 119th, and the 195th. Certainly one other, a Jaeger Division, was engaged on the fourth day, and almost certainly others that were not identified. The Germans, possibly the 3rd Guards Division, whom the Highland Division had twice before heavily defeated in the Ypres and Cambrai battles, showed their appreciation of the stubborn resistance offered by the Jocks by floating over to our lines a white paper balloon, on which was written, "Good old 51st, still sticking it out." A Jaeger officer captured near Grévillers, on being asked if they had suffered heavy losses, replied, "We have not yet captured sufficient ground to make us a cemetery for our dead." Certainly a tour of the German cemeteries after the country had been recaptured showed a huge increase in new graves. One of the features of this battle was the work of the "Q" and administrative officers. The movements of battalion transport and the ammunition column were carried out in perfect order through the whole operation. Men were issued with hot food from the field-kitchens whenever a pause in the operations made this possible. Not a single vehicle except those that were unfit for the road fell into the hands of the enemy. The supply of ammunition, though it caused the gravest anxiety, and though the Divisional Ammunition Column was at one time completely empty, never actually failed. As regards the supply of gun ammunition and the making up of deficiencies in guns, the artillery made their own arrangements. Although the demands for ammunition were heavy, it cannot be said, in spite of the enormous quantity expended, that any unit suffered from the want of it. Moreover, every dump of field artillery ammunition was exhausted before our lines retired behind it, the Beugny and Lebucquière dumps being worked even though continually being set on fire by the hostile shell-fire. By the evening of the 22nd seventeen new field-guns had been issued to replace guns knocked out. The Divisional and brigade signal sections had considerable difficulty in maintaining any form of communication, but they competed with their difficulties admirably. The linesmen, with great gallantry, laid and maintained numerous lines throughout the operations. In consequence, after the first phase of the battle, it was nearly always possible to talk from Divisional to brigade headquarters. When one considers the volume of shell-fire to which these lines and the men laying and repairing them were subjected, it will be realised that the signallers, though their work is of a kind which often passes unnoticed, must have shown a fine courage and determination. They were assisted considerably in their task by the fact that after the first phase all three brigades occupied the same headquarters.