The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
So far as the direct effect of the spectacular but bloodless
bombardment of Fort Sumter was concerned it failed of its purpose. Even
such an event did not prompt the Virginia convention, as had been hoped
and confidently anticipated, to adopt an ordinance of secession. On
the day after news of it was received in Richmond the representatives
of the mother state stood as resolutely as ever in opposition to a
secession program, which they deemed at once impolitic and unjustified
by anything in the situation of affairs.
But the bombardment accomplished its intended effect by indirection.
It gave Mr. Lincoln occasion to call for a volunteer army with which
to meet what had thus assumed the character of a war upon the United
States. As has been already related he called for seventy-five thousand
men and demanded of Virginia that she should furnish her proportional
part of that force. After many weeks of resolute resistance to what
the Virginians regarded as a policy of quixotic folly and certain
destruction, the Virginia convention on the seventeenth of April,
1861, adopted an ordinance of secession. From that hour war was on in
earnest, as both sides quite clearly understood.
CHAPTER XII
THE ATTITUDE OF THE BORDER STATES
With the secession of Virginia on the seventeenth of April, 1861, there
came a final end to all hope of finding a way out. The active border
states did not immediately declare their secession indeed, but that was
a foregone conclusion so far as Arkansas, North Carolina and Tennessee
were concerned, and military proceedings did not wait for the formal
act. That came on the sixth of May, in Arkansas, on the twentieth of
May in North Carolina, and on the eighth of June in Tennessee. Kentucky
and Missouri were so divided in sentiment that no united action for or
against the Union could be secured.
Kentucky officially assumed an attitude of neutrality to which neither
side paid the smallest attention then or later. That indeed was the
most impossible of all conceivable attitudes. It assumed to the state
all the independent right of action that secession itself implied,
without asserting a claim to the right of secession. It proclaimed
Kentucky to be so far out of the Union as to demand respect for its
neutrality and so far in the Union as to exercise its full voice in
Congress. It warned the armies of both sides to avoid trespass upon
Kentucky's territory, a warning which, if Kentucky had undertaken to
enforce, it would have involved that state in immediate war with both
the combatants at one and the same time. The thing was ridiculous
from the beginning, absurd in conception and a ludicrous failure in
execution. There was later a pretense of secession by a so-called
convention in that state, but it was not taken seriously on either
side, and in the end the state furnished volunteers to both the
contending armies in substantially equal numbers.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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