The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
In the meantime an ignorant and impatient popular clamor and an
unintelligent press "opinion"--for there is a certain type of newspaper
editor who is apt to regard his own hasty and ill-informed judgment of
things that he knows little or nothing about, as an "opinion"--hounded
and persecuted the man who was expected to retrieve the Manassas
defeat. Even Mr. Lincoln, with all his patience, became impatient of
McClellan's inaction--which was excessive perhaps--and almost angrily
urged him to action. He called the general's attention to the fact that
he had under his command a force greatly superior in numbers to any
that the Confederates could muster and that the country was impatient
for an advance.
McClellan seems to have had no thought of making his way to Richmond
by the route of Centreville and Manassas, where Johnston lay behind
impregnable fortifications. He knew the easier road of approach up
the James river from Fortress Monroe as a base of operations. But,
at all hazards, the Government, the press and the people insisted,
Washington city must be covered and protected, and so McClellan's
first care was to feel of the works at Centreville and Manassas
before transferring his army down the Potomac and the Chesapeake to
Fortress Monroe. Accordingly, on the tenth of March, 1862, he pushed
a column forward toward Centreville and Manassas only to find those
strongly fortified positions already abandoned. General Johnston had
interpreted McClellan's plans aright, and was transferring his army
to the Peninsula east of Richmond in order to meet his adversary's
confidently-expected advance in that quarter.
There was nothing now, neither defended works nor an opposing army, to
forbid McClellan's march upon Richmond by the Manassas route, while
it was certain that Johnston was fortifying Williamsburg and other
defensible points upon the other route and concentrating his forces
there to meet McClellan's advance when it should come.
But McClellan was above all things a man of orderly and methodic
mind, a man not to be turned from a pre-arranged plan of action by
the offering of any opportunity, however advantageous it might be. So
instead of pushing on towards Richmond by the route which his enemy
had thus left undefended, he turned about, sent his army by water to
Fortress Monroe, and confronted his adversary where that adversary was
best prepared at all points to meet him.
In the meanwhile General Burnside had completed the occupation of the
southern coast by the seizure of Beaufort, Roanoke, Newberne and Fort
Macon, and another Federal force a little later, on the eleventh of
April, captured Fort Pulaski, near the mouth of the Savannah river.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account