The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
North of Richmond and from five to seven miles distant the Chickahominy
river runs in a course almost due east from its source. McClellan
placed his main force north of that erratic and uncertain stream and
there awaited the reinforcements for which he was clamorously calling.
But he threw his left wing across the river to the Richmond side of
it. Unless he were prepared to advance at once with all his force and
assail the Confederate works this was an exceedingly dangerous thing
to do, for the Chickahominy is a phenomenally uncertain and erratic
river. In dry weather it is scarcely more than a brook, but in periods
of rain--and spring in Virginia is a rainy season--it swells suddenly
and quickly to almost impassable proportions, while the swamps that
form its banks become morasses in which it is difficult to find even
a foothold, and impossible to discover a fit camping place for troops.
When McClellan established his left wing south of the river the stream
presented no obstacle to its prompt reinforcement from the other side
in case of need. But presently the windows of heaven were opened and
the fountains of the great deep were broken up. The floods came, and
this isolated left wing was cut off and left mainly to its own devices
for self-maintenance.
The Confederate General Johnston was quick to see and seize this
opportunity. On the morning of the thirty-first of May, he assailed the
detached left wing and there resulted the two-days' battle called Fair
Oaks at the North, and Seven Pines at the South.
Johnston's force scarcely, if at all, outnumbered the detached left
wing of McClellan's army, but his hope was, by determined fighting to
cut off that part of McClellan's army from the main body that lay north
of the river, and to crush and destroy it before it could be reinforced.
In his first assaults he was conspicuously successful, and had his
expectation been realized that McClellan would be unable to reinforce
his detached left wing from the other side of the river it is probable
that Johnston's operation would have made prisoners of that wing of
McClellan's army which lay south of the turbulent river. But two events
stood in the way. One of the many frail bridges across the Chickahominy
remained, in spite of the floods, as an available means of crossing.
Some of its supports had given way under pressure of the waters and it
was manifestly tottering to its fall. But General Sumner, ordered to
support the imperiled force south of the river, heroically disregarded
the danger and pushed his force across the frail and tottering
structure, ordering his men to "break step" in the passage in order
that the swing of the cadenced step might not cause the bridge to sway
and fall. Thus perilously, he crossed, just in time to meet and defeat
a Confederate effort to gain control of the bridge and destroy it, thus
completely cutting off communication between the two wings of the Union
Army.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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