The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
In the meanwhile the administration at Washington, nervously and even
absurdly apprehensive as it was, plucked up courage enough to order
McDowell, with the army at Fredericksburg, reinforced by Shields with
11,000 men, to march on the twenty-sixth across country by way of the
Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, and join McClellan's right wing
before Richmond.
Timidity itself could not have hesitated to consent to this movement.
It placed an army of more than 40,000 men in front of Washington and
between that capital and the Confederate forces of 60,000 men or less,
that McClellan was already beleaguering at Richmond with 120,000 men,
while it left Banks in the Valley with 8,000 and the easy support of
Fremont's 15,000 men to check any movement that Jackson might make
upon Washington with his force of not more than 15,000 or 16,000.
Yet so great was the apprehension felt at Washington for the safety of
that city that when the time came, Lee played upon it with success and
by his play upon it deprived McClellan of reinforcements from McDowell,
Banks and Fremont, aggregating nearly 65,000 men.
Turning about, after his pursuit of Schenck, Jackson quickly formed
a junction of his own force with Ewell's, and with 16,000 or 17,000
men turned upon Banks, who was now retreating down the Valley toward
Strasburg. He struck first at a detachment at Front Royal which he
surprised and almost completely destroyed on the twenty-third of May.
On the twenty-fourth Banks decided to abandon Strasburg and retreat to
Winchester, destroying his stores and such wagons of his train as he
could not save from capture. Jackson's cavalry destroyed a multitude
more of them on march, throwing the Federal trains into the utmost
confusion. Jackson now had a much stronger force than Banks--about
three men indeed to Banks's one.
With his vastly superior force Jackson set out to obey his orders,
which were to "clear the valley and threaten Washington," so as to
compel the diversion of McDowell's army from McClellan's reinforcement
before Richmond.
The task was an inviting one and Jackson accomplished it promptly.
Marching tirelessly, by night as well as by day, he quickly drove
Banks from Strasburg to Middletown and from Middletown to Winchester.
At Winchester he broke Banks's force into bits in a hotly contested
battle, and having cut off the Federal general's retreat to Harper's
Ferry, sent him flying in confusion by way of Martinsburg to
Williamsport on the upper Potomac. Banks fought stubbornly against such
odds as no commander could hope to overcome, but finding himself beaten
and his columns disintegrated he skilfully retreated over the space
of thirty-four miles in a single day, and successfully placed himself
behind the Potomac where his force could threaten Jackson's flank, if
the great Confederate should move upon Washington by way of Harper's
Ferry.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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