The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical HistoryEggleston, George Cary
History
The History of the Confederate War, Its Causes and Its Conduct, Volume 1 (of 2): A Narrative and Critical History
Eggleston, George Cary
United States -- History -- Civil War, 1861-1865
The failure of these two generals to fulfil their obligations--a
failure which resulted in the baffling of Lee's supreme purpose at the
very moment when their presence must have given him quite all that he
desired of victory--might well have been made the subject of an inquest
by court martial or by a court of inquiry. But as Lee in the exceeding
gentleness of his nature omitted to order any such inquest, the matter
presents no authoritative basis of fact on which the historian may rest
an award of blame. This much, however, seems to be certain--that if
Huger and Magruder had done what Lee had ordered them to do, and what
they might easily have done, McClellan's army must have been destroyed
or captured on that thirtieth day of June, 1862.
As it was, McClellan fought all day and at night resumed his retreat,
still doggedly intent upon that one difficult problem of "saving
this army," concerning which he had written so doubtfully and so
despairingly and so bitterly in his heart-wrung protest to Secretary
Stanton.
After a fearfully bloody struggle the Federal army was able during the
night to retire toward Malvern Hill, a position which the Confederates
could not assail without exposing themselves to the destructive cross
fire of the Federal fleet in the James river.
McClellan had now been completely dislodged from his position on the
east and north of Richmond. He had been defeated in battle day after
day, and driven out of his fortifications into a helpless retreat to
the cover of his gunboats in the James river. His base of supplies at
White House had been utterly broken up. He had lost in this series
of battles no less than 15,249 men. The Confederates, being the
assailants, had suffered even greater losses.
The Confederates at this point made one disastrous mistake. They
had believed that McClellan would retreat by the route by which he
had come, and in that belief they had remained where they were for
twenty-four hours. During that precious time McClellan had moved his
enormous wagon train and his great herd of 2,500 cattle towards his new
base.
At White House General Casey loaded all the supplies he could upon
transports and sent them to the new base. But he was obliged to burn
millions of pounds of food and destroy hundreds of tons of ammunition
which he could not remove. Trains of freight cars were loaded with food
and ammunition and deliberately switched off the railroad tracks and
into the river to prevent them from falling into the possession of the
Confederates.
In brief McClellan's defeat was disastrous in the extreme; but by
reason of the failure of Lee's lieutenants to do their proper part at
the critical time the Federal commander was spared the humiliation of
a surrender. He escaped instead to Malvern Hill after a succession of
bloody defeats and after sacrificing the greater part of his reserve
stores of food and ammunition at what he had established as a secure
base of supplies.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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