The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that period — John Shaqi
The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that periodGordon, William
History
The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that period
Gordon, William
United States -- History -- Colonial period, ca. 1600-1775; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
There was such a continued backwardness in the Americans to serve in the
army, that gen. Washington was more and more convinced that it could
never be raised to the new establishment by voluntary inlistments. [Jan.
18.] Such was its present inequality to capital operations, that it was
unanimously agreed in a council of war, to request thirteen regiments of
militia to be at Cambridge by the first of February, and to remain if
wanted to the last of March, that so a vigorous attempt might be made on
the army at Boston, if practicable. The news of the unsuccessful attempt
upon Quebec, and gen. Montgomery’s death. [Jan. 24.] was publicly known
not only in the American quarters but at Boston. Let me give you an
account of the siege down to the latest intelligence from thence.
The garrison of Quebec, when gen. Montgomery appeared before it,
consisted of col. Maclean’s men, a hundred and seventy; a company of the
seventh regiment, sixty; marines, forty; militia, about eight hundred;
and seamen belonging to the king’s frigates and to the merchant ships
which wintered in the harbor, four hundred and fifty; in all, fifteen
hundred and twenty. The general was at the head of upwards of eight
hundred men[1] only so small was the force he brought with him, after
leaving a corps at Montreal; and so much was Arnold’s detachment
reduced, by the return of col. Enoe’s division and other unfavorable
circumstances. Thus you see the besiegers were little more than half the
garrison. Upon his appearing before the city he sent forward a flag of
truce which was fired upon by order of Sir Guy Carleton; [Dec. 6, 1775.]
at this gen. Montgomery was so provoked, that the next day he wrote to
Sir Guy a letter, in which he departed from the common mode of conveying
his sentiments, and made use of threats and language that he would
otherwise have probably declined. Notwithstanding the inclemency of the
season he set about erecting works. His batteries were composed of snow
and water, which soon became solid ice. He planted on them five pieces
of ordnance, twelve and nine pounders, with one howitzer; but the
artillery was inadequate, and made no impression; it was therefore soon
in contemplation to storm the city. [Dec. 16.] A council was held by all
the commanding officers of col. Arnold’s detachment in the evening; and
a large majority was for storming the garrison, as soon as the men were
provided with bayonets, spears, hatchets, and hand granades. In a few
days several of the men were ill of the small-pox those who were well
and fit for service were ordered to wear hemlock sprigs in their hats to
distinguish them in the attack upon the works. [Dec. 25.] Col. Arnold’s
detachment paraded in the evening, at capt. Morgan’s quarters, when gen.
Montgomery attended, and addressed them on the subject of an assault on
Quebec, in a sensible spirited manner. The scheme of storming was wholly
the general’s who in the council of war on the occasion, showed the
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