The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that period — John Shaqi
The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that periodGordon, William
History
The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that period
Gordon, William
United States -- History -- Colonial period, ca. 1600-1775; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
[Feb. 14.] About four in the morning, a party from the castle under col.
Leslie joined another, amounting to about five hundred, sent over the
ice to Dorchester Neck by gen. Howe. They burnt about half a dozen
houses; but the general’s scheme failed. He had been up the whole night,
getting ready for an attack with a large body of troops. He expected,
that the burning of the houses would occasion such an alarm, as to put
the American officers upon sending from Roxbury lines a large
reinforcement, and thereby giving him an advantageous opportunity of
attacking them; but at day break, he found their men as usual at their
alarm posts, so that he declined it. The strength of the ice having been
tried in one place, and the frost continuing, general Washington was
desirous of embracing the season for passing over it, from Cambridge
side into Boston. He laid before a council of war [Feb. 16.] the
following question: “A stroke well aimed at this critical juncture, may
put a final period to the war, and restore peace and tranquility so much
to be wished for, and therefore whether, part of Cambridge and Roxbury
bays being frozen over, a general assault should not be made on Boston?”
General Ward opposed the idea, saying, “The attack must be made with a
view of bringing on an engagement, or of driving the enemy out of
Boston, and either end will be answered much better by possessing
Dorchester heights.” General Gates was also against it. The commander in
chief was evidently for it. He did not appear enough sensible of the
importance of Dorchester heights; and probably confided too much in the
courage and perseverance of the continental troops and militia. When the
votes were called for, the majority were against the attack. The
commander in chief could not refrain from showing that he was greatly
dissatisfied. But a negative being put on the question, the next point
to be considered was, whether they should possess themselves of
Dorchester heights, with a view of drawing the enemy out. This was
agreed upon; and the conducting of the business was left wholly to
general Ward, who with generals Thomas and Spencer, commanded on that
quarter. They had been for some time collecting fascines, gabions, &c.
unknown to general Washington, in expectation that the same would be
wanted for this purpose. Had they not practised such foresight, it is to
be much doubted whether they could have been in sufficient forwardness.
The militia, which were called for from the New-England colonies to
assist in some grand operation meant to be undertaken between the first
of February and the end of March, collected apace; but the want of arms
was prodigious. Every thing was carried on with the utmost expedition;
that so the heights might be occupied as soon as possible. The design
was no secret, and many were fearful, that general Howe would secure
them before the Americans—but he could not spare a sufficient force for
the purpose.
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