The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that periodGordon, William
History
The history of the rise, progress, and establishment of the independence of the United States of America, Vol. 2 (of 3) : $b Including an account of the late war, and of the thirteen colonies, from their origin to that period
Gordon, William
United States -- History -- Colonial period, ca. 1600-1775; United States -- History -- Revolution, 1775-1783
[July 2.] On the near approach of the right wing of the royal army upon
the Tyconderoga side, the Americans abandoned their works toward Lake
George, and left gen. Philips to possess the advantageous post of Mount
Hope, without making any resistance, which must have been ineffectual,
and could have answered no good purpose. That apparent supineness and
want of vigor with which they were chargeable, was not occasioned by
cowardice or incapacity, but actual imbecility. Gen. Burgoyne’s troops
proceeded with much expedition in the construction of their works, the
bringing up of artillery, stores and provisions, and the establishment
of their posts. But what gave the greatest alarm, was the very rapid
progress they made in clearing a road and getting artillery on
Sugar-hill. When once they had erected a battery on this height, only a
few hours more would have been required to have invested the Americans
on all sides, which might have been effected by occupying the ground on
the east side of Lake Champlain, below Mount Independence, where the
pass from the lake to East-Creek is very narrow. The same reason which
prevented gen. St. Clair’s calling in the militia when the royal army
was at a distance, prevailed when they drew nearer. Having received
intelligence by spies, that in 24 hours the investiture would be
completed, when he should be cut off from all possibility of succour,
gen. Scuyler, not having force sufficient at Fort Edward to relieve him,
he determined to evacuate his posts, though he knew it would produce
such astonishment as had not happened since the commencement of the war.
If he was sensible at the time, that should he remain there, he would
save his character but lose the army; whereas did he go off, he should
save the army but lose his character, and did he courageously conclude
upon sacrificing the last to the cause in which he was engaged, he
deserves the warmest commendations. A council of war was called, and it
was unanimously concluded upon to evacuate as soon as possible. The
general, by evacuating, intended to throw his troops between the country
and the royal army, that the militia might have a body to collect to,
whereas Burgoyne would otherwise be at liberty to pursue his operations
without any obstacle. Proper measures were immediately taken for
effecting the evacuation. Orders were given to the troops to take with
them, before they left the ground 8 days provisions, sufficient to have
carried them to the North-River had they pursued the route intended. The
general meant to push for Skeensborough, and there to have met the 200
boats and 5 armed gallies, on board of which were embarked at night as
much cannon, stores and provisions as time would permit. The officer in
the Jersey redoubt was to continue firing his connon every half hour,
toward the battery the enemy were erecting opposite to him till further
orders, that there might be no suspicion of the manœuvres going forward.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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