because the “really” is something not concretely experienced (whose nature accordingly is the critic’s business); and this is to depart from the empiricist’s point of view, to attribute to him a postulate he expressly repudiates. The material point may come out more clearly if I say that we must make a distinction between a thing as _cognitive_, and one as _cognized_.[50] I should define a cognitive experience as one that has certain bearings or implications which induce, and fulfil themselves in, a subsequent experience in which the relevant thing is experienced _as_ cognized, _as_ a known object, and is thereby transformed, or reorganized. The fright-at-the-noise in the case cited is obviously _cognitive_, in this sense. By description, it induces an investigation or inquiry in which both noise and fright are objectively stated or presented--the noise as a shade-wind fact, the fright as an organic reaction to a sudden acoustic stimulus, a reaction that under the given circumstances was useless or even detrimental, a maladaptation. Now, pretty much all of experience is of this sort (the “is” meaning, of course, is experienced _as_), and the empiricist is false to his principle if he does not duly note this fact.[51] But he is equally false to his principle if he permits himself to be confused as to the concrete differences in the two things experienced. There are two little words through explication of which the empiricist’s position may be brought out--“_as_” and “_that_.” We may express his presupposition by saying that things are what they are experienced _as_ being; or that to give a just account of anything is to tell what _that_ thing is experienced to be. By these words I want to indicate the absolute, final, irreducible, and inexpugnable concrete _quale_ which everything experienced not so much _has_ as _is_. To grasp this aspect of empiricism is to see what the empiricist means by objectivity, by the element of control. Suppose we take, as a crucial case for the empiricist, an out and out illusion, say of Zöllner’s lines. These are experienced as convergent; they are “truly” parallel. If things are what they are experienced as being, how can the distinction be drawn between illusion and the true state of the case? There is no answer to this question except by sticking to the fact that the experience of the lines as divergent is a concrete qualitative thing or _that_. It is _that_ experience which it is, and no other. And if the reader rebels at the iteration of such obvious tautology, I can only reiterate that the realization of the _meaning_ of this tautology is the key to the whole question of the objectivity of experience, as that stands to the empiricist. The lines of _that_ experience _are_ divergent; not merely _seem_ so. The question of truth is not as to whether Being or Non-Being, Reality or mere Appearance, is experienced, but as to the _worth_ of a certain concretely experienced thing. The only way of passing upon this