[8] I must remind the reader again of a point already suggested. It is the identification of presence in consciousness with knowledge as such that leads to setting up _a_ mind (_ego_, subject) which has the peculiar property of knowing (only so often it knows wrong!), or else that leads to supplying “sensations” with the peculiar property of surveying their own entrails. Given the correct feeling that knowledge involves relationship, there being, by supposition, no other _thing_ to which the thing in consciousness is related, it is forthwith related to a soul substance, or to its ghostly offspring, a “subject,” or to “consciousness” itself. [9] Let us further recall that this theory requires either that things present shall already be psychical things (feelings, sensations, etc.), in order to be assimilated to the knowing mind, subject to consciousness; or else translates genuinely naïve realism into the miracle of a mind that gets outside itself to lay its ghostly hands upon the things of an external world. [10] This means that things may be present _as_ known, just as they be present as hard or soft, agreeable or disgusting, hoped for or dreaded. The mediacy, or the art of intervention, which characterizes knowledge, indicates precisely the way in which known things as known are immediately present. [11] If Hume had had a tithe of the interest in the _flux_ of perceptions and in _habit_--principles of continuity and of organization--which he had in distinct and isolated existences, he might have saved us both from German _Erkenntnisstheorie_, and from that modern miracle play, the psychology of elements of consciousness, that under the ægis of science, does not hesitate to have psychical elements compound and breed, and in their agile intangibility put to shame the performances of their less acrobatic cousins, physical atoms. [12] In other words, the situation as described is not to be confused with the case of hunting on purpose to test an idea regarding the dog. [13] Dr. Moore, in an essay in “Contributions to Logical Theory” has brought out clearly, on the basis of a criticism of the theory of meaning and fulfilment advanced in Royce’s “World and Individual,” the full consequences of this distinction. I quote one sentence (p. 350): “Surely there is a pretty discernible difference between experience as a purposive idea, and the experience which fulfils this purpose. To call them both ‘ideas’ is at least confusing.” The text above simply adds that there is also a discernible and important difference between experiences which, _de facto_, are purposing and fulfilling (that is, are seen to be such _ab extra_), and those which meant to be such, and are found to be what they meant.