[204] An indication of this may be seen in the fact that words which have come down to modern times as technical terms of geometry were used indifferently in the physical and moral sciences, e.g. _theorem_ (θεώρημα), Philo, _Leg. alleg._ 3. 27 (i. 104), θεωρήμασι τοῖς περὶ κόσμου καὶ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ: Epict. _Diss._ 2. 17. 3; 3. 9. 2; 4. 8. 12, &c., of the doctrines of moral philosophy: sometimes co-ordinated or interchanged with δόγμα, e.g. Philo, _de fort._ 3 (ii. 877), διὰ λογικῶν καὶ ἠθικῶν καὶ φυσικῶν δογμάτων καὶ θεωρημάτων: Epictet. _Diss._ 4. 1. 137, 139, and as a variant _Ench._ 52. 1. So _definition_ (ὁρισμός) is itself properly applicable to the marking out of the boundaries of enclosed land. So also ἀπόδειξις was not limited to ideal or “necessary” matter, but was used of all explanations of the less by the more evident; e.g. Musonius, _Frag. ap. excerpt. e Joann. Damasc._, in Stob. _Ecl._ ii. 751, ed. Gaisf., after defining it, gives as an example a proof that pleasure is not a good. [205] ὁ δὲ νόμος βασιλέως δόγμα, Dio Chrys. vol. i. p. 46, ed. Dind. [206] The use of the word in Epictetus is especially instructive: δόγματα fill a large place in his philosophy. They are the inner judgments of the mind (κρίματα ψυχῆς, _Diss._ 4. 11. 7) in regard to both intellectual and moral phenomena. They are especially relative to the latter. They are the convictions upon which men act, the moral maxims which form the ultimate motives of action and the resolution to act or not act in a particular case. They are the most personal and inalienable part of us. See especially, _Diss._ 1. 11. 33, 35, 38; 17. 26; 29. 11, 12; 2. 1. 21, 32; 3. 2. 12; 9. 2; _Ench._ 45. Hence ἀπὸ δογμάτων λαλεῖν, “to speak from conviction,” is opposed to ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν λαλεῖν, “to speak with the lip only,” _Diss._ 3. 16. 7. If a man adopts the δόγμα of another person, e.g. of a philosopher, so as to make it his own, he is said, δόγματι συμπαθῆσαι, “to feel in unison with the conviction,” _Diss._ 1. 3. 1. Sextus Empiricus, _Pyrrh. Hypot._ 1. 13, distinguishes two philosophical senses of δόγμα, (1) assent to facts of sensation, τὸ εὐδοκεῖν τινι πράγματι, (2) assent to the inferences of the several sciences: in either sense it is (_a_) a strictly personal feeling, and (_b_) a firm conviction, not a mere vague impression: it was in the latter of the two senses that the philosophers of research laid it down as their maxim, μὴ δογματίζειν: they did away, not with τὰ φαινόμενα, but with assertions about them, _ibid._ 1. 19, 22: their attitude in reference to τὰ ἄδηλα was simply οὐχ ὁρίζω, “I abstain from giving a definition of them,” _ibid._ 1. 197, 198. [207] Sext. Empir. _Pyrrh. Hypot._ 1. 3. [208] _Ibid._ 4, δογματική, ἀκαδημαϊκή, σκεπτική.