[237] _Diss._ 1. 17. 4, ἐπείγει μᾶλλον θεραπεύειν, the interpolated remark of a student when Epictetus has begun a lecture upon Logic: the addition, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, seems to show that the phrase was a customary one. [238] _Diss._ 1. 4. [239] Sext. Emp. iii. 239. [240] The Stoics defined wisdom as θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην, and philosophy as ἄσκησιν ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης, Plutarch (Aetius), _plac. phil._ 1. 2; Galen, _Hist. Phil._ 5; Diels, _Doxogr. Gr._ pp. 273, 602. [241] _De Abraham._ 11 (ii. 9); _de Joseph._ 1 (ii. 41); _de prœm. et pœn._ 8, 11 (ii. 416, 418). Philo is quoted because his writings are in some respects as faithful a photograph of current scholastic methods as those of Epictetus. It is also possible that some of the writings that stand under Philo’s name belong to the same period. [242] _Quod det. potior._ 12 (i. 198, 199): so _de congr. erud. caus._ 13 (i. 529); _de mut. nom._ 13 (i. 591). [243] _De congr. erud. caus._ 28 (i. 542). [244] _Leg. alleg._ 3. 6 (i. 91). [245] _Quis rer. div. heres._ 51 (i. 509). [246] M. Aurel. 1. 7. [247] _Enchir._ 47: cf. _Diss._ 3. 14. 4. In _Diss._ 3. 12. 17, part of the above is given as a quotation from Apollonius of Tyana. [248] _Diss._ 2. 18. 27; cf. 3. 2. 1; 3. 12. 1; 4. 1. 81. [249] _Nigrin._ 27. [250] _Orat._ xx. vol. i. pp. 288 sqq. (Dind.), περὶ Ἀναχωρήσεως. [251] Vol. ii. p 240. [252] Vol. ii. p. 246. [253] _Ench._ 4, 13, 30. [254] The χρῆσις φαντασιῶν is an important element in the philosophy of Epictetus. Every object that is presented to the mind by either the senses or imagination tends to range itself in the ranks of either good or evil, and thereby to call forth desire or undesire: in most men this association of particular objects with the ideas of good or evil, and the consequent stirring of desire, is unconscious, being the result of education and habit: it is the task of the philosopher to learn to attach the idea of good to what is really good, so that desire shall never go forth to what is either undesirable or unattainable: this is the “right dealing with ideas.” _Diss._ 1. 28. 11; 1. 30. 4; 2. 1. 4; 2. 8. 4; 2. 19. 32; 3. 21. 23; 3. 22. 20, 103. [255] ἐφαρμογὴ τῶν προλήψεων τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους, _Diss._ 1. 2. 6; 1. 22. 2, 7; 2. 11. 4, 7; 3. 17. 9, 12, 16; 4. 1. 41, 44: προλήψεις are the ideas formed in the mind by association and blending. [256] _Diss._ 1. 1. 31; 1. 4. 18; 1. 17. 21; and elsewhere. [257] _Diss._ 1. 4. 23. [258] The distinction between (1) ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις, the desire to have or not to have, and (2) ὁρμή, ἀφορμή, the effort to do or not to do, is of some importance in the history of psychology. It probably runs back to the Platonic distinction between τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος and τὸ θυμοειδὲς μέρος. [259] _Diss._ 2. 10. [260] 1. 9. 6, 13. [261] 1. 14. 6. [262] 3. 13. 15. [263] 1. 14. 6; 1. 17. 27; 2. 8. 11. [264] 1. 14. 6. [265] 2. 14. 11. [266] 2. 8. 12-14. [267] 1. 9. 5; 2. 8. 11. [268] 1. 9. 4. [269] 1. 3. 1.