Capture of the French commander-in-chief and five ships-of-the-line 489 Details of the action 489 Analysis of the effects of Rodney's manoeuvre 491 Tactical bearing of improvements in naval equipment 493 Lessons of this short naval campaign 495 Rodney's failure to pursue the French fleet 496 Examination of his reasons and of the actual conditions 497 Probable effect of this failure upon the conditions of peace 498 Rodney's opinions upon the battle of April 12 499 Successes achieved by Rodney during his command 500 He is recalled by a new ministry 500 Exaggerated view of the effects of this battle upon the war 500 Subsequent career of De Grasse 501 Court-martial ordered upon the officers of the French fleet 502 Findings of the court 502 De Grasse appeals against the finding 503 He is severely rebuked by the king 503 Deaths of De Grasse, Rodney, and Hood 504 CHAPTER XIV. CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE MARITIME WAR OF 1778. The war of 1778 purely maritime 505 Peculiar interest therefore attaching to it 506 Successive steps in the critical study of a war 507 Distinction between "object" and "objective" 507 Parties to the war of 1778 507 Objects of the different belligerents 508 Foundations of the British Empire of the seas 510 Threatened by the revolt of the colonies 510 The British fleet inferior in numbers to the allies 511 Choice of objectives 511 The fleets indicated as the keys of the situation everywhere 513 Elements essential to an active naval war 514 The bases of operations in the war of 1778:-- In Europe 515 On the American continent 515 In the West Indies 516 In the East Indies 518 Strategic bearing of the trade-winds and monsoons 518 The bases abroad generally deficient in resources 519 Consequent increased importance of the communications 519 The navies the guardians of the communications 520 Need of intermediate ports between Europe and India 520