The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval history, Modern; Sea-power
Misled by reports from England, and still more by the representations
of James, who fondly nursed his belief that the attachment of many
English naval officers to his person was greater than their love of
country or faithfulness to their trust, Louis XIV. determined to
attempt an invasion of the south coast of England, led by James in
person. As a first step thereto, Tourville, at the head of between
fifty and sixty ships-of-the-line, thirteen of which were to come
from Toulon, was to engage the English fleet; from which so many
desertions were expected as would, with the consequent demoralization,
yield the French an easy and total victory. The first hitch was in the
failure of the Toulon fleet, delayed by contrary winds, to join; and
Tourville went to sea with only forty-four ships, but with a
peremptory order from the king to fight when he fell in with the
enemy, were they few or many, and come what might.
On the 29th of May, Tourville saw the allies to the northward and
eastward; they numbered ninety-nine sail-of-the-line. The wind being
southwest, he had the choice of engaging, but first summoned all the
flag-officers on board his own ship, and put the question to them
whether he ought to fight. They all said not, and he then handed them
the order of the king.[73] No one dared dispute that; though, had they
known it, light vessels with contrary orders were even then searching
for the fleet. The other officers then returned to their ships, and
the whole fleet kept away together for the allies, who waited for
them, on the starboard tack, heading south-southeast, the Dutch
occupying the van, the English the centre and rear. When they were
within easy range, the French hauled their wind on the same tack,
keeping the weather-gage. Tourville, being so inferior in numbers,
could not wholly avoid the enemy's line extending to the rear of his
own, which was also necessarily weak from its extreme length; but he
avoided Herbert's error at Beachy Head, keeping his van refused with
long intervals between the ships, to check the enemy's van, and
engaging closely with his centre and rear (Plate VIa. A, A, A). It is
not necessary to follow the phases of this unequal fight; the
extraordinary result was that when the firing ceased at night, in
consequence of a thick fog and calm, not a single French ship had
struck her colors nor been sunk. No higher proof of military spirit
and efficiency could be given by any navy, and Tourville's seamanship
and tactical ability contributed largely to the result, which it must
also be confessed was not creditable to the allies. The two fleets
anchored at nightfall (B, B, B), a body of English ships (B')
remaining to the southward and westward of the French, Later on, these
cut their cables and allowed themselves to drift through the French
line in order to rejoin their main body; in doing which they were
roughly handled.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account