The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval history, Modern; Sea-power
War alone could not entail it, if only war could be postponed until
the processes of circulation within and without the kingdom were
established and in vigorous operation. They did not exist when he took
office; they had to be both created and firmly rooted in order to
withstand the blast of war. Time was not given to accomplish this
great work, nor did Louis XIV. support the schemes of his minister by
turning the budding energies of his docile and devoted subjects into
paths favorable to it. So when the great strain came upon the powers
of the nation, instead of drawing strength from every quarter and
through many channels, and laying the whole outside world under
contribution by the energy of its merchants and seamen, as England has
done in like straits, it was thrown back upon itself, cut off from the
world by the navies of England and Holland, and the girdle of enemies
which surrounded it upon the continent. The only escape from this
process of gradual starvation was by an effectual control of the sea;
the creation of a strong sea power which should insure free play for
the wealth of the land and the industry of the people. For this, too,
France had great natural advantages in her three seaboards, on the
Channel, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean; and politically she had
had the fair opportunity of joining to her own maritime power that of
the Dutch in friendly alliance, hostile or at least wary toward
England. In the pride of his strength, conscious of absolute control
in his kingdom, Louis cast away this strong reinforcement to his
power, and proceeded to rouse Europe against him by repeated
aggressions. In the period which we have just considered, France
justified his confidence by a magnificent, and upon the whole
successful, maintenance of his attitude against all Europe; she did
not advance, but neither did she greatly recede. But this display of
power was exhausting; it ate away the life of the nation, because it
drew wholly upon itself and not upon the outside world, with which it
could have been kept in contact by the sea. In the war that next
followed, the same energy is seen, but not the same vitality; and
France was everywhere beaten back and brought to the verge of ruin.
The lesson of both is the same; nations, like men, however strong,
decay when cut off from the external activities and resources which at
once draw out and support their internal powers. A nation, as we have
already shown, cannot live indefinitely off itself, and the easiest
way by which it can communicate with other peoples and renew its own
strength is the sea.
FOOTNOTES:
[66] Campbell: Lives of the Admirals.
[67] Martin: History of France.
[68] See Map of English Channel, etc., p. 107.
[69] That is, nearly motionless.
[70] Hoste: Naval Tactics.
[71] Ledyard says the order to remove the buoys was not carried out
(Naval History, vol. ii. p. 636).
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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