THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE 1793-1812 BY CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U.S.N. PRESIDENT UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE AUTHOR OF "THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783" OF "THE GULF AND INLAND WATERS," AND OF A "LIFE OF ADMIRAL FARRAGUT" IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. I. FOURTH EDITION. LONDON SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON (LIMITED) UNIVERSITY PRESS: JOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U.S.A. PREFACE. The present work, like its predecessor, "The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783," is wholly a result of the author's connection with the United States Naval War College as lecturer upon Naval History and Naval Tactics. When first asked to undertake that duty, the question naturally arose how to impart to the subject of Naval History an aspect which, in this very utilitarian age, should not be open to the ready reproach of having merely archæological interest, and possessing no practical value for men called upon to use the changed materials of modern naval war. "You won't have much to say about history," was then the somewhat discouraging comment of a senior officer of his own service. In pondering this matter, it occurred to the author—whose acquaintance with naval history was at that time wholly superficial—that the part played by navies, and by maritime power generally, as a factor in the results of history, and as shaping the destinies of nations and of the world, had received little or no particular attention. If this were so, an analysis of the course of events through a series of years, directed to show the influence of Sea Power upon History, would at least serve to imbue his hearers with an exalted sense of the mission of their calling; and might also, by throwing light upon the political bearings of naval force, contribute to give the service and the country a more definite impression of the necessity to provide a fleet adequate to great undertakings, lest, if an occasion should arise for what he has ventured to call "statesmanship directing arms," we should be found unprepared, through having no sufficient armed force to direct.