(_c_) In the _third_ place, the beautiful (Kant says) has the form of teleology,[106] in as far as a teleological character is perceived in the object without the idea of an end. At bottom this only repeats the view which we have just discussed. Any natural production, _i.e._ a plant or an animal, is organized teleologically, and is so immediately a datum to us in this its teleology that we have no separate abstract idea of the end, distinct from its given reality. It is in this way that even _the beautiful_ is to be displayed to us as teleological. In finite teleology[107] end and means remain external to one another, inasmuch as the end stands in no essential inner relation to the material medium of its accomplishment. In this case, the idea of the end in its abstraction[108] distinguishes itself from the object in which the end appears as realized. The beautiful, on the other hand, exists as teleological in itself, without means and end revealing themselves in it as distinct aspects. For instance, the purpose of the limbs of an organism is the vitality which exists as actual in the limbs themselves; separately they cease to be limbs. For in the living thing the end and the material medium of the end are so directly united, that the existing being only exists so long as its purpose dwells in it. The beautiful, Kant maintains, when considered from this point of view, does not wear its teleology as an external form attached to it; but the teleological correspondence of the inner and outer is the immanent nature of the beautiful object. (_d_) Lastly, Kant's treatment determines the beautiful, in the _fourth_ place, as being recognized, without a conception, as object of a _necessary_ delight. Necessity is an abstract category, and indicates an inner essential relation of two aspects; _if_ the one is, and _because_ the one is, _then_ (_and therefore_) the other is. The one in its nature involves the other as well as itself, just as cause, _e.g._, has no meaning without effect. The delight which the beautiful involves is such a necessary consequence, wholly without relation to conceptions, _i.e._ to categories of the understanding. Thus, for instance, we are pleased no doubt by what is symmetrical, and this is constructed in accordance with a conception of the understanding. But Kant requires, to give us pleasure, even more than the unity and equality that belong to such a conception of the understanding.