When General Kuropatkin arrived at Mukden at the end of March and took over the command from General Linevitch, he had on paper an army of over 250,000 men. It was made up as follows: 223,000 infantry; 21,764 cavalry; 4,000 engineers; and artillery consisting of 496 field guns, 30 horse artillery guns, and 24 machine guns. This large force was organized in four Army Corps, each with divisions of infantry and its quota of artillery and cavalry; while there were also two independent divisions of Cossacks, four brigades of Frontier Guards, railway troops, fortress artillery and a number of small units not allotted. The First Army Corps was under the command of General Baron Stackelberg, the Second under General Sassulitch, the Third under General Stoessel, and the Fourth under General Zarubaieff. It was an imposing force, this army of Manchuria, calculated to strike terror into the hearts of an Oriental enemy, but unfortunately for the Russians it lacked one thing, and that was reality. The actual position of affairs was indeed very different. To begin with, the greater part of the troops were not near the front at all when the Commander-in-Chief appeared upon the scene to direct operations, but were being pushed along the Siberian Railway with a feverish haste which at the same time did not denote proportionate speed. When they did arrive they arrived in detached fragments, and the desperate necessities of the case did not admit of adherence to the paper arrangements. For instance, the 7th and 8th Divisions, which should have formed part of the Second Army Corps under General Sassulitch, were, as a matter of fact, sent to assist in garrisoning Port Arthur and Vladivostock. Port Arthur, it will be remembered, was by this time under the command of General Stoessel, who was therefore unable to direct the operations of the Third Army Corps, which properly should have been entrusted to him. On the other hand, the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, which belonged to that Corps, and the 6th East Siberian Rifle Division, which should have been attached to the First Army Corps, were sent to the Yalu, where, as we have already seen, they took part in the ill-fated conflict of the 1st of May. It will be observed from these shifts--only a few of the most noticeable out of many--that the Army Corps system of the Manchurian Army had completely broken down, and that the ideal of a coherent fighting force, with officers and men trained together in peace under the conditions to which they would be subjected in war, had not been attained in the slightest degree. The lack of organization which prevailed in the distribution of the larger commands was equally manifest in the mobilization of the units of which they were composed. Regiments were not complete; hastily-formed levies had to be added to bring them up to their nominal strength; and the ranks of the officers had to be filled up in many cases with volunteers from regiments in other parts of the Empire.