The Japan-Russia War: An Illustrated History of the War in the Far EastTyler, Sydney
History
The Japan-Russia War: An Illustrated History of the War in the Far East
Tyler, Sydney
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
The result was a composite
force very different indeed in fighting power from the splendid
machine which the Mikado's strategists had been carefully perfecting
in time of peace in readiness for the struggle which they had so long
foreseen.
[Sidenote: The Thin Black Line of Reinforcements]
In bringing even this haphazard collection of unco-ordinated units to
the front in Manchuria, the greatest difficulties had been experienced.
All that European observers had predicted about the working capacity of
a railway like the Trans-Siberian for the conveyance of a huge army for
thousands of miles came true to the letter. Prince Khilkoff, the
Director-General of Russian Railways, undoubtedly did wonders, and the
tremendous efforts which he and his staff put forth, especially in
surmounting the great natural obstacle presented by Lake Baikal, were
worthy of all praise. But to carry an army of 250,000 men, with all its
necessary supplies and munitions of war, into Manchuria in the time
required for the purpose of striking an effective blow at an enemy like
the Japanese was a task beyond the powers of any railway staff in the
world. The rickety single line, with infrequent sidings, which
stretches across the steppes of Siberia from Harbin to the Urals was
quite inadequate for such a feat of transport. By the middle of May,
therefore, the position in which General Kuropatkin found himself--a
position partly created by himself, as Minister of War, and partly
created for him by the ineptitude of others--was widely different from
that which the easy and thoughtless optimists in St. Petersburg had
anticipated when the war broke out. The Fourth Army Corps was not
across Lake Baikal; 30,000 or 40,000 men were shut up in the fortresses
of Port Arthur and Vladivostock, and were not only useless for field
operations, but were themselves liable to siege and capture; and,
allowing the highest possible estimate, the Russian Commander-in-Chief
had at his disposal for assuming the offensive in Manchuria no more
than 100,000 men with 260 guns.
[Sidenote: Position of the Russian Army]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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