Suppose the question were one of practice, and the Superior were to require some service on the part of a subordinate Jesuit, of which that subordinate, if he dared to think, might be clearly convinced that it was morally and scripturally wrong. It is true that, according to the strict letter of the Constitutions, such thought is impossible, because the principle of obedience is there extended not merely to the action, but to the judgment; so that a true and thorough-going Jesuit is prepared to vow that his very thoughts shall be in harmony with those of his Superior. But though conscience may be seared, it is very hard to silence it; and though the sophistry of cunning schoolmen may perplex truth with intricate questions of subtle casuistry, there is a clear broad line of demarcation between sin and virtue, between right and wrong, and there is a clear knowledge of that broad distinction so immoveably fixed amidst the ruins of our fallen nature, that it is almost impossible to imagine even a Jesuit in any real doubt, when in the secrets of his own chamber he calmly reflects upon the question, Is a lie right, or a murder blameless? But suppose that the Superior commands him either to lie or murder, what then? Conscience says, “It is sin.” The law of God says, “It is sin.” The Superior says, “It must be done.” Which then is to be obeyed? Mr. Seymour put the question to his Jesuit friend at Rome. The man did not hesitate to maintain that the Superior must be obeyed, and the conscience sacrificed, and added, that “he should consider that the more the matter commanded was opposed to his private judgment, revolting to his personal feelings, or wounding to his individual conscience, the more in proportion would be the meritoriousness of obedience under such trying circumstances.” {30} But this, it may be urged, was the private opinion of an individual Jesuit, and therefore not justly chargeable upon the great body of the Society. The distinction is clearly one of great importance, for we know in our own times how men may be members of a Church, and yet downright traitors to its principles; and also how with our whole soul we utterly repudiate those who can solemnly read the Thirty-nine Articles in the desk, and then preach the direct opposite from the pulpit. It would not be fair, therefore, to attach to the Order the opinions of the individual, unless these can be proved to be fully borne out and sanctioned by the fixed and authoritative documents of the Society. Nothing, however, can be clearer, than that the sentiments then expressed, were those not of the man, but of the Order; for in the Constitutions {31} it is expressly directed that “those who live under obedience should permit themselves to be moved and directed under Divine Providence by their Superiors, just as if they were a corpse, which allows itself to be moved and handled in any way, or as the staff of an