And while so much freedom has been exercised in censuring the official conduct of some of the Aldermen of our city,—a freedom that is suggested and can be sustained by facts,—it is due to the cause of truth and justice to repeat emphatically what is readily admitted above, that many of the magistrates are eminently deserving of commendation, as well for the abilities they possess, as for the use to which those abilities are applied in the discharge of their vexatious duties. And it may be added, that some of those who have been most censured, have shown themselves possessed of good feelings, and amenable to the requirements of courtesy and humanity. The system is in fault; and till that is changed for the better,—reformed altogether,—we cannot look for any considerable improvement in the administration of justice in police offices. For it is a lamentable fact, that such is the want of confidence in some of the magistrates, that the decisions of the able and the good are treated with a distrust most dangerous to public order. Our judiciary, from the lowest offices to the highest, was derived from England. The names of the officials, the cause of their proceedings, the rules of their action, are all from the parent country. If we have not derived from these all the benefits which might be expected, and all we see England enjoy, it is worth while for those interested to inquire what has disturbed public opinion, what has weakened public respect, what has augmented the law’s delay, or what has strengthened the general opinion of its uncertainty. So far as such feelings, if any such exist, may connect themselves with the “courts of record” of our State, it is not the object of the present Report to discuss the cause, to point to their extent, or suggest a remedy. But we have legitimately before us the evils of a bad system of minor justice, and we are therefore right in suggesting a remedy.