The practical effect of the former change is to destroy in great measure the value and efficacy of the indeterminate sentence as a remedial and reformatory measure. In other words, the amendment restores the vicious _inequality of sentences_, which is always so apt to breed a feeling of injustice and resentment in the one convicted, and which therefore greatly unfits him as a subject for reformatory treatment. It proceeds upon the long-accepted but false assumption that the court can in every case determine the exact degree of culpability and then adjust the punishment accurately to the crime. This is not only absurd, but it is impossible. A Solomon with all his wisdom could not have done this! As the law now stands, we shall again find, as is indeed already the case, that the same court or adjoining courts may, even under practically identical conditions, impose greatly varying sentences, instead of putting all upon whom sentence is passed on an equality and giving all, under identical conditions, an equal chance, as the law originally contemplated. Thus since the amended law went into effect sentences like these have been pronounced: Minimum 5 years, maximum 7; minimum 8 years, maximum 10; minimum 6 months, maximum 1 year; minimum 6 years, maximum 7; minimum 7 years, maximum 15. In two cases of burglary the one man received a minimum of 5 years, and a maximum of 10, but the other a minimum of only 2 years and a maximum of 5; while in another case an old crook, who had been convicted for the sixth time, and whose new crimes should have brought him a maximum sentence of 16 years, received a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of 1 year. Since the law first went into effect several courts have also imposed flat sentences, without a minimum. This is clearly in conflict with the law, which is mandatory. It does seem as if courts that try and sentence lawbreakers should be the first to have a reverent regard for law!