The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
“I see that all these complications of society are artificial,” adds
Rousseau; “man has made them; they are not good, and let us tear them
down and make anew.” These utterances echo all over France and Europe.
“The state is merely a machine by which the few exploiter the many”—“off
with crowns!” Thereupon they snatch off the crown of poor Louis, and his
head follows with it. “Reason” is enthroned and dethroned. Thirty years
of war satiates at length this negative second period, and the third
phase begins. Its characteristic is to be constructive, not to accept
the heritage of the past with passivity, nor wantonly to destroy, but to
realize itself in the world of objectivity—the world of laws and
institutions.
The first appearance of the second phase of consciousness is
characterized by the grossest inconsistencies. It says in general, (see
D’Holbach’s “Système de la Nature”): “The immediate, only, is true; what
we know by our senses, alone has reality; all is matter and force.” But
in this utterance it is unconscious that matter and force are purely
general concepts, and not objects of immediate consciousness. What we
see and feel is not matter or force in general, but only some special
form. The self-refutation of this phase may be exhibited as follows:
I. “What is known is known through the senses: it is matter and force.”
II. But by the senses, the particular only is perceived, and this can
never be _matter_, but merely a _form_. The general is a mediated
result, and not an object of the senses.
III. Hence, in positing matter and force as the content of sensuous
knowing, they unwittingly assert mediation to be the content of
immediateness.
The decline of this period of science results from the perception of the
contradiction involved. Kant was the first to show this; his labors in
this field may be summed up thus:
The universal and necessary is not an empirical result. (General laws
cannot be sensuously perceived.) The constitution of the mind itself,
furnishes the ground for it:—first, we have an _a priori_ basis (time
and space) necessarily presupposed as the condition of all sensuous
perception; and then we have categories presupposed as the basis of
every generalization whatever. Utter any general proposition: for
example the one above quoted—“all is matter and force”—and you merely
posit two categories—Inherence and Causality—as objectively valid. In
all universal and necessary propositions we announce only the subjective
conditions of experience, and not anything in and for itself true (i. e.
applicable to things in themselves).
At once the popular side of this doctrine began to take effect. “We know
only phenomena; the true object in itself we do not know.”
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