The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
_Un._ What you say seems to me a distinction in words merely.
_Reason._ Doubtless. All distinctions are merely in words until one has
learned to see them independent of words. But you must go and mend that
tripod on which you are sitting; for how can one think at ease and
exhaustively, when he is all the time propping up his basis from
without?
_Un._ I cannot understand you. [Exit.]
_Note._
It will be well to consider what application is to be made of these
distinctions to the mind itself, whose form is consciousness. In
self-knowing, or consciousness, the subject knows itself—it is its own
object. Thus in this phase of activity we have the affirmative Infinite.
The subject is its own object—is continued by its other or object. This
is merely suggested here—it will be developed hereafter.
CHAPTER III.
In the first chapter we attained—or at least made the attempt to
attain—some insight into the relation which Mind bears to Time and
Space. It appeared that Mind is a _Transcendent_, i. e. something which
Time and Space inhere in, rather than a somewhat, conditioned by them.
Although this result agrees entirely with the religious instincts of
man, which assert the immortality of the soul, and the unsubstantiality
of the existences within Time and Space, yet as a logical result of
thinking, it seems at first very unreliable. The disciplined thinker
will indeed find the distinctions “a priori and a posteriori”
inadequately treated; but his emendations will only make the results
there established more wide-sweeping and conclusive.
In the second chapter we learned caution with respect to the manner of
attempting to realize in our minds the results of thought. If we have
always been in the habit of regarding Mind as a property or attribute of
the individual, we have conceived it not according to its true nature,
but have allowed Imagination to mingle its activity in the thinking of
that which is of a universal nature. Thus we are prone to say to
ourselves: “How can a mere attribute like Mind be the logical condition
of the solid realities of Space and Time?” In this we have quietly
assumed the whole point at issue. No system of thinking which went to
work logically ever proved the Mind to be an attribute; only very
elementary grades of thinking, which have a way of assuming in their
premises what they draw out analytically in their conclusions, ever set
up this dogma. This will become clearer at every step as we proceed.
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