The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867Various
Philosophy
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. I, Nos. 1-4, 1867
Various
Philosophy -- Periodicals
We will now pursue a path similar to that followed in the first chapter,
and see what more we can learn of the nature of Mind. We will endeavor
to learn more definitely what constitutes its _a priori_ activity, in
order, as there indicated, to achieve our object. Thus our present
search is after the “Categories” and their significance. Taking the word
category here in the sense of “a priori determination of thought,” the
first question is: “Do any categories exist? Are there any thoughts
which belong to the nature of mind itself?” It is the same question that
Locke discusses under the head of “Innate ideas.”
I.
“Every act of knowing or cognizing is the translating of an unknown
somewhat into a known, as a scholar translates a new language into his
own.” If he did not already understand one language, he could never
translate the new one. In the act of knowing, the object becomes known
in so far as I am able to recognise predicates as belonging to it. “This
is _red_;” unless I know already what “red” means, I do not cognize the
object by predicating _red_ of it. “Red is a color;” unless I know what
“color” means, I have not said anything intelligible—I have not
expressed an act of cognition. The object becomes known to us in so far
as we recognize its predicates—and hence we could never know anything
unless we had at least one predicate or conception with which to
commence. If we have one predicate through which we cognize some object,
that act of cognition gives us a new predicate; for it has dissolved or
“translated” a somewhat, that before was unknown, into a known; the
“not-me” has, to that extent, become the “me.” Without any predicates to
begin with, all objects would remain forever outside of our
consciousness. Even consciousness itself would be impossible, for the
very act of self-cognition implies that the predicate “myself” is well
known. It is an act of identification: “I am myself;” the subject is, as
predicate, completely known or dissolved back into the subject. I
cognize myself as myself; there is no alien element left standing over
against me. Thus we are able to say that there must be an a priori
category in order to render possible any act of knowing whatever.
Moreover, we see that this category must be identical with the _Ego_
itself, for the reason that the process of cognition is at the same time
a recognition; it predicates only what it recognizes. Thus,
fundamentally, in knowing, Reason knows itself. Self-consciousness is
the basis of knowledge. This will throw light on the first chapter; but
let us first confirm this position by a psychological analysis.
II.
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