In fine, it is evident that the idealism which the correlationist logically falls into is as strict as that of any school of professed idealism which he is in the habit of condemning. The _persistent force_ is the general _idea_ of force, not found as any _real_ force, for each _real_ force is individualized in some particular way. But it is evident that a particular force cannot be correlated with _force in general_, but only with a special form like itself. But the general force is the only abiding one—each particular one is in a state of transition into another—a perpetual losing of individuality. Hence the true abiding force is not a _real_ one existing objectively, but only an _ideal_ one existing subjectively in thought. But through the fact that thought can seize the true and abiding which can exist for itself nowhere else, the correlationist is bound to infer the transcendency of Mind just like the idealist. Nay, more, when he comes to speak considerately, he will say that Mind, for the very reason that it thinks the true, abiding force, cannot be correlated with any determined force. CHAPTER IV. Philosophers usually begin to construct their systems in full view of their final principle. It would be absurd for one to commence a demonstration if he had no clear idea of what he intended to prove. From the final principle the system must be worked back to the beginning in the Philosopher’s mind before he can commence his demonstration. Usually the order of demonstration which he follows, is not the order of discovery; in such case his system proceeds by external reflections. All mathematical proof is of this order. One constructs his demonstration to lead from the known to the unknown, and uses many intermediate propositions that do not of necessity lead to the intended result. With another theorem in view, they might be used for steps to that, just as well. But there is a certain inherent development in all subjects when examined according to the highest method, that will lead one on to the exhaustive exposition of all that is involved therein. This is called the _dialectic_. This dialectic movement cannot be used as a philosophic instrument, unless one has seen the deepest _aperçu_ of Science; if this is not the case, the dialectic will prove merely destructive and not constructive. It is therefore a mistake, as has been before remarked, to attempt to introduce the beginner of the study of Philosophy at once into the dialectic. The content of Philosophy must be first presented under its sensuous and reflective forms, and a gradual progress established. In this chapter an attempt will be made to approach again the ultimate principle which we have hitherto fixed only in a general manner as _Mind_. We will use the method of external reflection, and demonstrate three propositions: 1. There is an independent being; 2. That being is self-determined; 3. Self-determined being is in the form of personality, i.